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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Michael T. Judge *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors have endeavored to select from the many cases
and bills those that have the most significant practical impact on
the daily practice of criminal law in the Commonwealth. Due to
space constraints, the authors have shied away from discussing
settled principles, with a focus on the "take away" for a particular
case.
Before diving into the specific cases, several general observa-
tions are in order. First, the Supreme Court of Virginia remains
very interested in criminal cases, which continue to comprise a
substantial portion of the court's docket. Second, although the
Supreme Court of Virginia's opinions frequently are unanimous,
the court remains divided, often by 4-3 vote, in some Fourth
Amendment areas.' Third, for good or for ill, the court has been
far less concerned about stare decisis than it has been in the past.
The court continues to overrule precedents, both recent and more
ancient. That is a welcome trend for attorneys seeking to over-
turn decisions viewed as unwise or confusing, but a frustrating
development for judges and practitioners who favor stability and
predictability in the law.
* Deputy Director, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Office of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 1989, George Mason University School of Law; B.S.,
1986, George Mason University.
** State Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia.
J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 1994, University of Virginia.
1. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 209, _ S.E.2d _ (2009). The
Commonwealth has appealed this decision. Commonwealth v. Rudolph, 277 Va. 209, __
S.E.2d - appeal docketed, No. 09-102 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://origin.
www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/09-102.htm.
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II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Alibi Defense and Jury Instruction
In Cooper v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia set
out to rationalize its jurisprudence on whether the defendant is
entitled to an alibi instruction when he requests one.2 The defen-
dant asked for an alibi instruction from the model jury instruc-
tion book. The trial court refused to grant it, reasoning that the
jury instructions covering the burden of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, the elements of the offense, and the presumption of in-
nocence were sufficient.4 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia acknowledged that its precedents had sent mixed signals
regarding whether a specific alibi instruction was required. 5 For
example, in a 1932 decision, Draper v. Commonwealth, the court
concluded that alibi was not so much a defense to the crime as it
was a "'rebuttal of the state's evidence.' ' 6 The Cooper court repu-
diated this view of alibi and held that it had changed its consid-
eration of the alibi concept.7 From now on, "an alibi instruction
should be granted when there is 'evidence that the accused was
elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the exact time or for
the entire period during which it was or could have been commit-
ted."'8 The court noted that this clear rule "will promote uniformi-
ty where uniformity is desirable."9
Although Cooper clarifies conflicting precedents, the way the
rule is worded may create problems. An alibi instruction is now
required when there is evidence that the defendant was else-
where than at the crime scene (1) at the "exact time" the crime
was committed, or (2) "for the entire period during which [the
crime] was or could have been committed."'10 However, the time of
2. See 277 Va. 377, 380-81, 673 S.E.2d 185, 187 (2009).
3. Id. at 380, 673 S.E.2d at 187.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 381-84, 673 S.E.2d at 187-89.
6. 132 Va. 648, 661, 111 S.E. 471, 475 (1922) (quoting 2 THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 53-54 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1896)).
7. Cooper, 277 Va. at 384-85, 673 S.E.2d at 189.
8. Id. at 385, 673 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 16, 20,
168 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1969)).
9. Id. at 385-86, 673 S.E.2d at 190.
10. Id. at 385, 673 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Johnson, 210 Va. at 20, 168 S.E.2d at 100)
(emphasis added).
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the crime cannot always be determined with exactitude. Nor will
alibi witnesses always be able to testify to the defendant's whe-
reabouts with precision. Will an instruction be required if evi-
dence shows the defendant was elsewhere during a portion of the
time that the crime might have been committed? What if the evi-
dence is not entirely clear? Future litigation will have to answer
these questions.
B. Batson Challenges
The importance of building a record to support a conviction is
an aspect of all criminal trials, but the content of the record is pa-
ramount when dealing with Batson" challenges. In Hopkins v.
Commonwealth, the prosecution exercised all four of its peremp-
tory strikes to remove African-American jurors, which left only
one African-American juror on the panel. 12 The prosecutor prof-
fered to the trial judge that he had struck two prospective jurors
because they had criminal records. 13 Two other panel members
were struck because they had family members who had been
charged with drug-related offenses and might be more sympa-
thetic to the defendant." The prosecutor, however, did not ad-
dress the fact that seven other jurors had family members
charged with drug-related offenses, at least three of whom were
not African-American, and the Commonwealth did not strike
them. 15 While the trial court found that one of the stricken panel
members (who had family members charged with drug-related of-
fenses) seemed very uneasy when asked about family members
with drug charges, the prosecutor gave no such reason for his
strike of that individual.' 6
In short, the record did not provide a complete explanation for
the strikes from the prosecutor as required by Batson.1 Whether
the trial court believed a juror was "uneasy" is not a substitute for
11. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 191 (1986). In Batson, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge-the dismissal of jurors
without stating a valid cause for doing so-may not be used to exclude jurors based solely
on their race. See id.
12. 53 Va. App. 394, 396, 672 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ct. App. 2009).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 396-97, 400, 672 S.E.2d at 891, 893.
16. Id. at 400, 672 S.E.2d at 893.
17. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
2009}
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the necessity of the prosecutor providing a reason for the strike.'8
The Hopkins court refused to substitute the trial court's reason
when the prosecutor had not stated the reason, noting that
"[a] Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up
any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretex-
tual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals
court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as
false." 9
The Commonwealth's stated reason for striking two jurors "was
equally applicable to other jurors who were not African-American
and were not [stricken] ."'20 The prosecutor failed to ensure that
the record provided the Commonwealth's explanation for the in-
consistency as required by prior opinions of the Court of Appeals
of Virginia.21 Consequently, the stated reason was not a satisfac-
tory race-neutral explanation for the Commonwealth's strikes
and the case was reversed and remanded. 22
C. Brady-Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
Gagelonia v. Commonwealth clarifies jurisprudence discussing
what types of evidence fall within the parameters of exculpatory
evidence.23 Different tests apply depending upon whether the
Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of
Brady, or the Commonwealth failed to preserve exculpatory evi-
dence.24 Gagelonia's Brady claims were premised upon the Com-
monwealth's failure to notify him that a videotape and cell
phones had disappeared from an investigator's custody prior to
trial.25 Gagelonia claimed these items may have impeached a po-
lice officer's trial testimony.26
18. Id. at 400, 672 S.E.2d at 893.
19. Id. at 400-01, 672 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252
(2005)).
20. Id. at 401, 672 S.E.2d at 893.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See 52 Va. App. 99, 113-14, 661 S.E.2d 502, 510 (Ct. App. 2008).
24. See id. at 112-15, 661 S.E.2d at 509-10; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an acussed . . .violates due process where the evi-
dence is material to either guilt or to punishment.. .. " Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
25. Gagelonia, 52 Va. App. at 113-14, 661 S.E.2d at 510.
26. Id. at 115, 661 S.E.2d at 510.
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The Commonwealth's failure to disclose that the videotape and
cell phones had disappeared did not constitute a Brady violation,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia reasoned, because the defendant
failed to show that the Commonwealth knew of their alleged ex-
culpatory value at the time they disappeared.27 Since Brady ap-
plies to evidence that has known exculpatory value, evidence of
an alleged exculpatory value that did not arise until after the evi-
dence was lost cannot form the basis of a Brady claim. 28 The court
noted that the defendant could not "meet his burden of proving
that this evidence was exculpatory merely by demonstrating its
absence .... "9 With respect to the cell phones, Gagelonia could
have obtained the alleged exculpatory evidence from another
source-his own cell phone records-and thus could never raise a
viable Brady claim."0 The court went on to note that the related
due process claim for the loss of the items was likewise without
merit because Gagelonia failed under all three prongs of the ap-
propriate test: he did not show the evidence had exculpatory val-
ue before it was lost; he failed to establish he could not obtain the
evidence from other sources; and he failed to establish bad faith
on the part of the officer that lost the evidence.3 1
D. Confrontation Clause
The implications of the Supreme Court of the United States'
decision in Crawford v. Washington continue to ripple through
the practice of criminal law.2
27. Id. at 115-16,661 S.E.2d at 510-11.
28. See id. at 114-15, 661 S.E.2d at 510-11.
29. Id. at 117, 661 S.E.2d at 511.
30. Id. at 116, 661 S.E.2d at 511.
31. Id. at 115-16, 661 S.E.2d at 510-11.
[A] defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of missing evidence formerly in
the Commonwealth's possession must show that (1) the evidence possessed
an apparent exculpatory value, (2) the defendant could not obtain comparable
evidence from other sources, and (3) the Commonwealth, in failing to pre-
serve the evidence, acted in bad faith. Furthermore, "[the presence or ab-
sence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must
necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evi-
dence at the time it was lost or destroyed."
Id. at 115, 661 S.E.2d at 510 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56 n.* (1988)).
32. See 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In Harper v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the Confrontation Clause test articulated in Crawford
did not apply to a sentencing proceeding.13 The court reasoned
that Crawford itself did not purport to disturb settled precedent
in this regard2 Moreover, the court noted that every United
States Court of Appeals to have considered the issue refused to
apply Crawford to sentencing proceedings.3 5 Therefore, the trial
court could properly admit, during the sentencing phase, hearsay
testimony from a witness who relayed statements by the child
victim. 3 6
E. Guilty Pleas
In Cobbins v. Commonwealth, the defendant asked for a conti-
nuance to replace his court-appointed attorney with private coun-
sel.37 The trial court refused to grant the continuance.3 8 The de-
fendant later entered an Alford plea.39 After pleading guilty to a
robbery charge and other crimes, Cobbins retained private coun-
sel.41 Cobbins then sought to withdraw his Alford plea, saying
that he was just "buying time" to obtain a lawyer who would
"fight this thing properly."41 He also explained that he had some
unspecified evidence that would impeach the victim and that
"other issues" might exonerate him.42
On appeal, Cobbins raised two issues: he contended that he
should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas, and
that the trial court erred in denying the requested continuance.4 3
To withdraw his Alford pleas, the court of appeals observed, the
defendant was required "(i) to establish a good-faith basis for
making the guilty plea and later seeking to withdraw it, and (ii)
33. See 54 Va. App. 21, 22, 675 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Ct. App. 2009).
34. See id. at 27, 675 S.E.2d at 844.
35. Id. at 29, 675 S.E.2d at 845.
36. See id. at 23, 675 S.E.2d at 842.
37. 53 Va. App. 28, 32, 668 S.E.2d 816, 818 (Ct. App. 2008).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 32 & n.1, 668 S.E.2d at 818 & n.1 ("When offering an Alford plea, a defen-
dant asserts his innocence but admits that sufficient evidence exists to convict him of the
offense." (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970))).
40. Id. at 31-33, 668 S.E.2d at 818-19.
41. Id. at 33, 668 S.E.2d at 819 (citation omitted).
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. Id.
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to proffer evidence of a reasonable basis for contesting guilt."44
The court held that Cobbins failed the first part of this test, and
noted that "[t]he guilty pleas served as a subterfuge designed to
manipulate the court, against its better judgment, into unwitting-
ly continuing the trial date. Because Cobbins acted in bad faith,
he could not justly expect the trial court to reward his duplicitous
conduct. ''45
The court of appeals further concluded that Cobbins had
waived the continuance issue by pleading guilty. 6 The court rea-
soned that an Alford plea is a type of guilty plea, and a guilty
plea waives all issues except for jurisdictional ones.4 7 Therefore,
the court declined to examine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the continuance.
49
F. Flight
In Turman v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the propriety of granting a flight instruction.4 9 The vic-
tim testified that she was raped and subjected to sexual battery.50
She said that, after the rape, she demanded that the defendant
leave or she would call the police.5 At that point, the defendant
"'lung[edl' at the victim and took the telephone from her." 2 The
victim ran to her bedroom and called the police.53 She then heard
the door to her apartment close.5 4 The defendant insisted that the
sexual encounter was consensual and that he had left when the
victim became angry.55 When he was stopped that evening, he al-
44. Id. at 34, 668 S.E.2d at 819 (citing Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 155-56,
645 S.E.2d 284, 289-90 (2007)).
45. Id. at 35-36, 668 S.E.2d at 820.
46. Id. at 36-37, 668 S.E.2d at 820.
47. Id. at 36, 668 S.E.2d at 820.
48. Id. at 37, 668 S.E.2d at 820.
49. See 276 Va. 558, 560-61, 667 S.E.2d 767, 768 (2008).
50. See id. at 562, 667 S.E.2d at 769.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 563, 667 S.E.2d at 769.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
2009]
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so told police that he had been in Prince William County, whereas
the victim lived in Fairfax County.5 6
In reversing the convictions, the court focused on the victim's
statements to the defendant asking him to leave and noted that
the defendant had started to dress himself.5 7 The court did not
address the fact that the defendant left the apartment only after
he "lunged" at the victim, that he took the telephone from her,
and that the victim ran to a place of safety in another room from
which she threatened to call the police. 51
Furthermore, in Clagett v. Commonwealth, the court had held
that "IfIlight is not limited to physically leaving a jurisdiction for
an extended period, but includes the taking of any action, even of
short duration, intended to disguise one's identity and distance
oneself from the crime."59 The Turman court's failure to distin-
guish Clagett is perplexing since the court of appeals specifically
relied on this language in Clagett in upholding the jury instruc-
tion.6 0 Turman's silence on Clagett may make it easier to distin-
guish in future cases that do not involve sexual assault defen-
dants who have past relationships with their victims and leave
the scene of the crime when the victim has secured a place of
safety in another room. In short, Turman's impact may be limited
to similar facts.
G. Juvenile Transfer Hearings
Virginia Code section 16.1-277.1(B) requires a juvenile and
domestic relations court to conduct a transfer hearing within 120
days from the date a petition is filed for juveniles who are not
held in secure detention or who are released after spending some
time in secure detention.6 1 In Harris v. Commonwealth, the de-
fendant's hearing was held after this 120-day period.62 He con-
56. Id. The victim's address is not provided in the case, but the authors assume she
lives in Fairfax County because the crime allegedly occurred at her residence, and the case
jurisdiction is Fairfax County.
57. See id. at 565, 667 S.E.2d at 771.
58. See id. at 565-66, 667 S.E.2d at 771.
59. 252 Va. 79, 93-94, 472 S.E.2d 263, 271 (1996).
60. See Turman v. Commonwealth, No. 0838-06-4, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 354, at "11-
12 (Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2007) (citing Clagett, 252 Va. at 93-94, 472 S.E.2d at 271).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-277.1 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
62. 52 Va. App. 735, 739-40, 667 S.E.2d 809, 811-12 (Ct. App. 2008).
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tended that this delay required dismissal of the charges.6 3 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the argument, concluding
that the defect was not jurisdictional.64 The court noted that in
Jamborsky v. Baskins, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the transfer deadline specified in Virginia Code section 16.1-
269(E) was not mandatory. 65 The court relied on the reasoning in
Jamborsky, concluding that
Code § 16.1-277.1(B) imparts no substantive right. Rather, in setting
forth the time within which the adjudicatory or transfer hearing
should be held, the statute merely directs the mode of proceeding by
the J&DR court. The language in the statute is not prohibitory or
limiting. Indeed, the statute does not expressly prohibit the court
from conducting the transfer or adjudicatory hearing beyond the 120
days absent good cause. Nor is there any language in the statute
that renders invalid an adjudicatory or transfer hearing held beyond
the 120 days absent good cause. Thus, finding no manifestation of a
contrary intent in the statute, we hold the provisions of Code § 16.1-
277.1(B) are directory and procedural, rather than mandatory and
jurisdictional. 6
The court also noted that the defendant suffered no prejudice
from the delay.67 Finally, by statute, the return of the indictments
by the grand jury cured any defects in the transfer statute.68
H. Indispensible Party
The court of appeals has dismissed appeals because of a minor
but critical aspect of appellate litigation-making sure the appeal
is noted against the proper party. In criminal cases, the choice of
parties is limited to the Commonwealth or a locality when the
conviction is for a violation of a local ordinance. 69 The overwhelm-
ing majority of cases involve appeals against the Commonwealth,
63. Id. at 742-43, 667 S.E.2d at 813.
64. Id. at 744, 667 S.E.2d at 814.
65. Id. at 743-44, 667 S.E.2d at 813-14 (citing Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506,
511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1994)).
66. Id. at 744, 667 S.E.2d at 814.
67. Id. at 746, 667 S.E.2d at 814.
68. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 815 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1429 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (granting localities authority to
prescribe fines and other punishments for violations of ordinances).
20091
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but failure to name the proper and indispensible party on convic-
tions of local ordinances instead of a state statute will result in
dismissal. 70
The appellate process is initiated by the filing of a notice of ap-
peal.
The notice of appeal is an important aspect of appellate litigation for
several reasons. First, it initiates the appeal. Second, it gives notice
to the parties that the litigation is not yet over and the victory in the
lower court may be short-lived. Third, it transfers jurisdiction of the
case from the circuit court to the appellate court. And fourth, and
most important for this case, it joins the indispensable and necessary
parties to the appeal and subjects them to the authority of the appel-
late court.7
In Woody v. Commonwealth, even though there may have been
actual notice to the county, and not just the state, the failure to
include the county in the notice of appeal prevented the court of
appeals from acquiring jurisdiction over an indispensible party,
and required dismissal of the appeal. 72
I. Nolle Prosequi
Wright v. Commonwealth provides the end to a legal journey
that began many decades ago: the legal consequence of denying a
defendant his statutory right to a preliminary hearing.73 In 1963,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that denying a defendant his
statutory right to a preliminary hearing did not violate his due
process rights under either the Constitution of Virginia or the
United States Constitution.74 In 1972, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held in Triplett v. Commonwealth that the denial of an ac-
cused's statutory right to a preliminary hearing could be reversi-
ble error.75 Twenty-six years later, in Armel v. Commonwealth,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that "upon nolle prosequi of
the offenses charged in the original warrants, [the] defendant was
70. See Woody v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 188, 197, 199, 670 S.E.2d 39, 44-45 (Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that in cases where a locality is the prosecuting authority, that locali-
ty is an indispensable party and noting that the failure to join an indispensable party re-
quires dismissal of the appeal).
71. Id. at 195-96, 670 S.E.2d 39 at 43 (2008) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 194, 200, 670 S.E.2d at 42, 45.
73. See 52 Va. App. 690, 695, 667 S.E.2d 787, 790 (Ct. App. 2008) (en banc).
74. Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 31, 129 S.E.2d 22, 28 (1963).
75. 212 Va. 649, 651, 186 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1972).
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no longer 'arrested on a charge of felony' [as] contemplated by
Code § 19.2-218" and thus could be indicted without the benefit of
a preliminary hearing. 76 In Armel, "good cause," as required by
Virginia Code section 19.2-265.3 for the entry of nolle prosequi
existed because a necessary witness was unavailable. 71
Wright answers the question of what happens when there is no
"good cause" for granting nolle prosequi. Since the preliminary
hearing requirement is a creature of statute, it is not surprising
that Wright found the answer to this question in the language of
the statute itself.78 The Wright court found that a preliminary
hearing statute only applies if the defendant "is actually under
arrest on a felony charge prior to indictment ... ,,79 Wright noted
that after nolle prosequi was entered, the defendant was no long-
er "'a person who is detained in custody by authority of law or
who is under a legal restraint,"' and that the absence of legal re-
straint, which terminated with the entry of nolle prosequi, ne-
gated the requirement of a preliminary hearing.80 The court of
appeals rejected the defendant's attempt to have the general dis-
trict court's entry of nolle prosequi declared void.8' Wright held
that absent fraud in the procurement of nolle prosequi, there was
no basis for declaring such an order void; and there was no basis
for appeal of such an order to a circuit court because the General
Assembly had not provided for review of such orders.8 2 Unless
there exists a factual scenario similar to Triplett or fraud, it is un-
likely that a defendant will ever be able to prevail on appeal for
any alleged deprivation related to a preliminary hearing.
76. 28 Va. App. 407, 411, 505 S.E.2d 378, 380 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-218 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009)).
77. See id. at 408, 505 S.E.2d at 379; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.3 (Repl. Vol.
2008)).
78. See Wright, 52 Va. App. at 710-11, 667 S.E.2d at 797 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-218 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2009)).
79. Id. at 700, 667 S.E.2d at 792 (quoting Moore v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 388, 394,
237 S.E.2d 187, 192 (1977)).
80. Id. at 700-01, 667 S.E.2d at 792 (quoting Moore, 218 Va. at 394, 237 S.E.2d at
192).
81. Id. at 704-05, 667 S.E.2d at 794.
82. Id. at 706, 667 S.E.2d at 795.
2009]
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J. Revocation Hearings
In Dickens v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
concluded that the failure to afford a defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the preparer of an affidavit at a revocation hearing
did not infringe upon the Due Process Clause.83 The trial court
considered an affidavit at the revocation hearing without afford-
ing the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.84
In the affidavit, the custodian of the records of the sex offender
registry averred that the defendant had not registered as a sex
offender . The court of appeals observed that "probation revoca-
tion hearings are not a stage of criminal prosecution and there-
fore a probationer is not entitled to the same due process protec-
tions afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution."86 Further-
more, a trial court can consider hearsay evidence, including affi-
davits, at the revocation hearing.8 Given these relaxed eviden-
tiary standards, the court held that due process did not require
cross-examination of the affiant. 88
K. Witness Immunity
In Murphy v. Commonwealth, the defendant agreed to testify
at a preliminary hearing against a co-defendant, in exchange for
which the prosecution would nolle prosequi a charge of transport-
ing drugs.8 9 After the defendant testified, he claimed that Virginia
Code section 18.2-262 required all charges to be dismissed.9 That
section states:
No person shall be excused from testifying... for the Common-
wealth as to any offense alleged to have been committed by another
under this article or under the Drug Control Act (§ 54.1-3400 et seq.)
by reason of his testimony.., tending to incriminate himself, but
83. 52 Va. App. 412, 422, 663 S.E.2d 548, 553 (Ct. App. 2008).
84. Id. at 416-17, 663 S.E.2d at 550.
85. Id. at 416, 663 S.E.2d at 550.
86. Id. at 417, 663 S.E.2d at 550 (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 84,
402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991)).
87. Id. at 421-22, 663 S.E.2d at 552-53.
88. See id. at 422-23, 663 S.E.2d at 553.
89. 277 Va. 221, 224, 672 S.E.2d 884, 885 (2009).
90. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 885-86.
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the testimony given... by such person on behalf of the Common-
wealth when called for by the trial judge or court trying the case, or
by the attorney for the Commonwealth, or when summoned by the
Commonwealth and sworn as a witness by the court or the clerk and
sent before the grand jury, shall be in no case used against him nor
shall he be prosecuted as to the offense as to which he testifies."
The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and Murphy
appealed. 92 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that
the plain language of the statute grants immunity only to wit-
nesses whose testimony is compelled. 93 The court further reasoned
that extending transactional immunity to such testimony is con-
sistent with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.9 4 The court observed that "Murphy's testimony was
voluntarily given in return for the Commonwealth's oral agree-
ment to dismiss the pending transportation of marijuana
charge .... 95
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Lawfulness of a Search
The scope of a personal frisk was at issue in Bandy v. Com-
monwealth.96 Police observed two men, in a public housing project
plagued by drug crime, walk up to a residence. 97 The men
knocked, but received no answer and began walking away.9 As
the police officers approached the men, the defendant's compa-
nion threw something in a bush.9 9 That something turned out to
be crack cocaine. 100 The officer asked if he could speak with the
defendant for a minute, and the defendant agreed.10 The defen-
dant could not provide the name of the person he was visiting,
91. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 886 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-262 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
92. Id. at 225, 672 S.E.2d at 886.
93. Id. at 228, 672 S.E.2d at 888.
94. Id. at 227-28, 672 S.E.2d at 887-88.
95. Id. at 228, 672 S.E.2d at 888.
96. See 52 Va. App. 510, 513, 664 S.E.2d 519, 520 (Ct. App. 2008).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 514, 664 S.E.2d at 521.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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nor could he give an address. 0 2 His answers to the officer's ques-
tions were "extremely evasive."10 The defendant was nervous and
kept shifting his hands in his pockets.0 4 The officer suspected the
defendant might have a weapon and informed him that he needed
to pat him down.0 ' On the first pass, the officer felt a bulge in the
defendant's pocket and heard a crinkle. 06 When the officer made
a second pass over the object with his fingers, he immediately and
correctly recognized the item as several crack cocaine rocks. 0 7 The
defendant contended that both the stop and the frisk were impro-
per. 108
The court of appeals first concluded that although the encoun-
ter was initially consensual, the defendant was seized when the
officer told him he was going to perform the pat-down.1°9 However,
the court held that the seizure was proper because the officer had
reasonable suspicion that the defendant might be involved in
drug-related activity and that the defendant might be trespass-
ing.1'0 The public housing property had several "No Trespassing"
signs, and the defendant provided inconsistent and evasive an-
swers concerning his presence.'
Next, the court concluded that the officer could perform a pat-
down because the officers could reasonably suspect that the de-
fendant was armed and dangerous.1 12 The defendant was in a
"high-drug, high-crime" neighborhood and accompanied a man
who had just discarded cocaine. 13 The court observed that the
link between drugs and violence is well established. 1 4 The defen-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 515, 664 S.E.2d at 521.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 515-16, 664 S.E.2d at 521-22.
109. Id. at 517, 664 S.E.2d at 522.
110. Id. at 518, 664 S.E.2d at 523.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. ('[The connection between illegal drug operations and guns is a tight one.'")
(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692, 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403, 407 n.3 (2006) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted))).
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dant appeared nervous and repeatedly put his hands in his pock-
ets, even though the officer had told him not to do so. 115
Finally, the court turned to the heart of the case-whether the
officer exceeded the scope of a proper frisk.116 The defendant com-
plained that the officer impermissibly manipulated the items in
the defendant's pocket.17 The court observed that the Fourth
Amendment does not necessarily forbid an officer from squeezing,
sliding, or manipulating items felt during a pat-down."18 The pur-
pose of the pat-down is to determine if the defendant is carrying a
concealed weapon." 9 "'Such searches necessarily involve a certain
amount of squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating of a
suspect's outer clothing, in an attempt to discern whether wea-
pons are hidden underneath."'120 The court explained that
[t]he crux of any analysis of whether an officer exceeds the scope of a
Terry "frisk" is simply whether the actions of the frisking officer go
beyond the basic determination of whether a suspect is armed. If the
officer's actions are reasonably calculated to determine whether the
suspect possesses a weapon, then the pat down is constitutionally
proper. Conversely, the officer exceeds the constitutional constraints
of a Terry frisk if he is trying to determine, through his sense of
touch, the nature or identity of an object he knows cannot be a wea-
pon.'
2 1
The court held that the officer's pat-down was properly directed
at a search for weapons. 22
115. Id. at 518-19, 664 S.E.2d at 523.
116. See id. at 519, 664 S.E.2d at 523.
117. Id. at 521, 664 S.E.2d at 524.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 258 (3d Cir. 2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 521-22, 664 S.E.2d at 524. A Terry stop occurs when a police officer searches
an individual without probable cause to arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
Such a search does not violate the individual's Fourth Amendment rights as long as the
officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit a crime. See id.
122. Id. at 522, 664 S.E.2d at 525.
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B. Lawfulness of a Stop
In Harris v. Commonwealth, a police officer received an ano-
nymous tip about a drunk driver. 23 The dispatcher who called
with the tip said the informant had described the defendant as
"Joseph Harris" and that Harris was driving "[a green] Altima,
headed south, towards the city, possibly towards the south
side."121 The caller had provided a partial license plate number of
"Y8066" and said the driver was wearing a striped shirt. 125 A po-
lice officer promptly located a vehicle that matched this descrip-
tion. 126 The officer observed the driver slow down at an intersec-
tion, even though the driver had the right of way. 12 He also
slowed down well in advance of a red light. 28 At no point did the
driver swerve or exceed the speed limit.129 After being followed for
a few minutes, the driver pulled to the side of the road, and the
officer made a traffic stop.130 It quickly became apparent that
Harris was driving drunk.3 ' He was convicted of driving under
the influence, after having twice been convicted of the same of-
fense. 132 He challenged his conviction on the basis that the officer
had conducted an improper Terry stop. 133
The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that anonymous tips
have "a relatively low degree of reliability, requiring more infor-
mation to sufficiently corroborate the information contained in
the tip.''134 The reliability of an anonymous tip can be bolstered
when it contains predictive information. 13 Such predictions must
relate to criminal behavior, not "observable or available to any-
one."136 In this instance, the tip contained no predictions about the
123. 276 Va. 689, 693, 668 S.E.2d 141, 144 (2008).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 694-95, 668 S.E.2d at 144-45.
134. Id. at 695, 668 S.E.2d at 145.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 695-96, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46.
[Vol. 44:339
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
defendant's future behavior.11 Finally, although the officer ob-
served "unusual" driving behavior, he had not observed any "er-
ratic" driving by the defendant. 138 Therefore, the court concluded,
the officer lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion and the stop vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment. 39 Three justices dissented from
this holding, and the Commonwealth has sought a writ of certi-
orari.1 0
C. Drug Dogs and Probable Cause
Drug detection dogs are an increasingly common feature of
traffic stops. In Jones v. Commonwealth, the defendant was
stopped for having an improper license plate registration."4 The
stop occurred in an area known for its drug problems. 14 2 The offic-
er summoned a drug detection dog before running the defendant's
driver's license.143 The drug dog arrived within three to five mi-
nutes, and immediately alerted the officer to the presence of
drugs.'4 Based on the alert, the officers searched the car and
found a loaded weapon and a small amount of marijuana.14 The
defendant contended that the dog's alert was not sufficiently reli-
able to justify the search because the prosecution had presented
no evidence of the dog's testing, training, and oversight.'4 6
After examining its own analogous precedents, as well as pre-
cedents from other courts, the court set forth the following stan-
dard:
[A] positive alert from a narcotics detection dog establishes probable
cause to conduct a search of a vehicle and ... evidence seized during
the search is admissible after a proper foundation has been laid to
show that the dog was sufficiently trained to be reliable in detecting
narcotics. The narcotics detection dog's reliability can be established
137. Id. at 696, 668 S.E.2d at 146.
138. Id. at 697-98, 668 S.E.2d at 146-47.
139. Id. at 698, 668 S.E.2d at 147.
140. Id.; Commonwealth v. Harris, 276 Va. 689, 668 S.E.2d 141 (2008), appeal dock-
eted, No. 08-1385 (U.S. May 11, 2009), available at http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/
docket108-1385.htm.
141. 277 Va. 171, 174, 670 S.E.2d 727, 729 (2009).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 175, 670 S.E.2d at 729.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 179, 670 S.E.2d at 729-30.
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from its training and experience, as well as a proven track record of
previous alerts to the existence of illegal narcotics. Specific certifica-
tions and the results of field testing are not required to establish a
sufficient foundation. However, if the dog's qualifications are chal-
lenged, the trial court may consider any relevant evidence in deter-
mining whether the Commonwealth has established the dog's relia-
bility in detecting narcotics. 147
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court held
that the search was proper.'4 8 The officer testified in detail about
the drug detection dog's qualifications, extensive training and ex-
perience, and success in detecting illegal drugs.1' 9 The fact that
the police did not conduct "backwards checks" to assess the dog's
reliability did not render the evidence inadmissible in light of the
totality of the evidence before the court. 150
D. Consent to Search
Another drug dog issue arose in Ellis v. Commonwealth.15 The
police stopped Ellis for an inoperative brake light.152 The officer
retrieved Ellis's driver's license to process it when he recalled
that Ellis had a narcotics history."13 He approached Ellis and
asked her if she would consent to a search of the car, but she re-
fused. 54 The officer then called for a drug detection dog.'15 The
drug dog arrived about five minutes later, while the officer was
preparing the paperwork for the traffic-related summons."' With-
in two minutes, the drug dog "alerted multiple times to the pres-
ence of drugs in Ellis's vehicle.""' Ellis then consented to a search
of her person. 1" 8 During the search, police recovered cocaine."19
147. Id. at 180-81, 670 S.E.2d at 732-33.
148. See id. at 181, 670 S.E.2d at 733.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See 52 Va. App. 220, 662 S.E.2d 640 (Ct. App. 2008).
152. Id. at 223, 662 S.E.2d at 641.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 224, 662 S.E.2d at 642.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Before trial and on appeal, the defendant argued that an un-
reasonably long detention had tainted her consent to search.16
The Court of Appeals of Virginia disagreed, affirming the defen-
dant's conviction.' The court observed that the traffic stop was
proper, and the only amount of time spent on drugs was the offic-
er's request to search the vehicle.162 At all other times, the officer
was preoccupied with the paperwork for the summons.'63
The court framed the issue as "whether such a de minimis de-
lay, caused by questioning unrelated to the specific reason for the
detention, invalidates a later, voluntary consent to search.",- Ex-
amining persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, the court
concluded that
"where a seizure of a person is based on probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation was committed, an officer does not violate the
Fourth Amendment by asking a few questions about matters unre-
lated to the traffic violation, even if this conversation briefly extends
the length of the detention."'65
The court held that the officer's questions did not violate the
Fourth Amendment and did not vitiate the defendant's consent.166
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Virginia courts addressed a number of evidentiary issues that
arose in the criminal context.
A. Expert Witnesses
Crimes against children present unique challenges. In Kilby v.
Commonwealth, the defendant challenged the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony on the issue of delayed disclosure of a child's alle-
gations of sexual abuse, contending the expert was not quali-
160. Id. at 224-25, 662 S.E.2d at 642.
161. See id. at 222, 662 S.E.2d at 641.
162. See id. at 224-26, 662 S.E.2d at 642-43.
163. Id. at 225, 662 S.E.2d at 642.
164. See id. at 226, 662 S.E.2d at 643.
165. Id. at 227, 662 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d
505, 510 (8th Cir. 2007)).
166. Id. at 228, 662 S.E.2d at 644.
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fled. 167 The expert had spent nine years as a forensic interviewer
and served as the lead forensic interviewer in the child abuse
program of a children's hospital.168 She earned a bachelor's degree
in social work, attended numerous forensic training programs,
and previously qualified as an expert in child sexual abuse cases
in three circuit courts and several military tribunals. 169 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia held that these qualifications were suffi-
cient and that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion. 170
The court found the defendant's reliance on Davison v. Com-
monwealth inapposite. 1' In that case, the court held that a wit-
ness was not qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of re-
cantation by child victims of sexual abuse. 72 The expert in
Davison had "degrees in psychology and social work and an ac-
quaintance with a single article" on recantation. 73 The expert
witness in Kilby, the court concluded, was "much more qualified
than the [expert] witness in Davison."74
B. Other Crimes Evidence
Pearce v. Commonwealth concerns the admissibility of evidence
regarding a defendant's use of alcohol and illegal drugs near in
time to his encounter with the police, and prior to his arrest. 1 5
The police observed the defendant, and others in a group, drink-
ing alcohol from open containers.176 During the encounter with the
group, members of the group-despite requests by officers not to
do so--continually placed their hands in their pockets. 77 As the
police started to pat-down members of the group, the defendant
fled.178 An officer gave chase, saw the defendant throw an object,
167. See 52 Va. App. 397, 403-05,663 S.E.2d 540, 543-44 (Ct. App. 2008).
168. Id. at 403, 663 S.E.2d at 543.
169. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 544.
170. Id. at 410-11, 663 S.E.2d at 547.
171. Id. (citing Davison v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 496, 504, 445 S.E.2d 683, 687
(Ct. App. 1994)).
172. Davison, 18 Va. App. at 504, 445 S.E.2d at 687.
173. Id.
174. Kilby, 52 Va. App. at 411, 663 S.E.2d at 547.
175. See 53 Va. App. 113, 116, 669 S.E.2d 384, 386 (Ct. App. 2008).
176. Id. at 116-17, 669 S.E.2d at 386.
177. Id. at 117, 669 S.E.2d at 386.
178. Id.
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and tackled the defendant.179 The officer returned to the area
where he had seen the defendant throw the object and found a
handgun. 180 At trial, the defendant testified that he did not throw
a gun. 8'
The trial court allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine the de-
fendant regarding his drug use and alcohol consumption at the
time of his arrest, over the defendant's other crimes objection.', 2
The court of appeals found this practice permissible, noting that
the evidence impeached the defendant's credibility, and was
"highly relevant" to the defendant's "'perception, recordation, re-
collection, narration, or sincerity." 8 3
The court in Pearce also rejected the defendant's attempt to
apply the Virginia Supreme Court's recent other crimes decision
in McGowan v. Commonwealth.184 In McGowan, the prosecutor
was allowed to introduce evidence to rebut a defendant's testimo-
ny that she "wouldn't know crack cocaine if [she] saw it." 18 The
defendant, who was charged with distribution of crack cocaine,
denied possessing the substance when she was arrested several
months later.186 The prosecutor then introduced testimony
through the arresting officer that the defendant had possessed
crack cocaine at the time of her subsequent arrest.18 7 McGowan
held that because of the remoteness in time of the subsequent
possession, it was reversible error to allow the defendant to be
impeached on this extrinsic point.'88
The Pearce court noted that, in contrast, the other crimes evi-
dence at issue was not remote in time, and that the prosecutor
had neither attempted to introduce the evidence as substantive
evidence in his case-in-chief nor sought to introduce extrinsic evi-
dence on a substantive point.189 Instead, the prosecutor sought to
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id., 669 S.E.2d at 387.
182. Id., 669 S.E.2d at 386-87.
183. Id. at 120, 122, 669 S.E.2d at 388-89 (quoting McCarter v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.
App. 502, 506, 566 S.E.2d 868, 869-70 (Ct. App. 2002)).
184. Id. at 121-23, 669 S.E.2d at 388-89 (citing McGowan v. Commonwealth, 274 Va.
689, 696, 652 S.E.2d 103, 106 (2007)).
185. McGowan, 274 Va. at 693, 652 S.E.2d at 104.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 695-96, 652 S.E.2d at 106.
189. Pearce, 53 Va. App. at 122-23, 669 S.E.2d at 389.
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introduce evidence to impeach the defendant by challenging his
ability to remember. 190 Once the defendant contradicted the offic-
er's testimony, the Commonwealth "had every right to" impeach
his credibility with evidence that he was intoxicated, which "was
highly relevant to his ability to perceive" the events as they hap-
pened. 9'
In Ortiz v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed the admission of other crimes evidence in a statutory rape
case.'92 The prosecutor introduced pornographic videotapes seized
from the defendant's home and a receipt for vaginal cream dated
prior to the sexual abuse, as well as evidence of other acts of sex-
ual intercourse between the thirteen-year-old victim and her
step-grandfather to corroborate the victim's testimony.9 3 The Or-
tiz court noted that other crimes evidence is generally inadmissi-
ble, but reaffirmed well-established precedent that allows evi-
dence of
"acts of incestuous intercourse between the parties other than those
charged in the indictment or information, whether prior or subse-
quent thereto ... if not too remote in point of time . . for the purpose
of throwing light upon the relations of the parties and the incestuous
disposition of the defendant toward the other party, and to corrobo-
rate the proof of the act relied upon for conviction .... ""'4
The evidence of other acts of sexual intercourse between the
victim and the defendant not only showed the defendant's pro-
pensity to commit rape during the specific time period charged,
but also fell within several exceptions that allow the admission of
such evidence, including "to show the conduct or attitude of [the
defendant] toward the [victim] to prove motive or method of
committing the rape, to prove an element of the crime charged, or
190. See id. at 122, 669 S.E.2d at 389. The defendant also argued that even if the trial
court properly admitted the evidence, it committed reversible error by not instructing the
jury that it could consider defendant's prior drug use only for impeachment purposes. Id.
at 123, 669 S.E.2d at 389. Pearce, however, held that the defendant's failure to request
such a limiting instruction precluded appellate review, and that the "ends of justice" ex-
ception was inapplicable because the limiting instruction did not relate to an element of
the crime charged and was not vital to his defense. Id. at 123-24, 669 S.E.2d at 389-90.
191. Id. at 122, 669 S.E.2d at 389.
192. See 276 Va. 705, 714, 667 S.E.2d 751, 757 (2008).
193. Id. at 713-14, 716, 667 S.E.2d at 756, 758.
194. Id. at 714, 667 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72, 77,
278 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1981)).
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to negate the possibility of accident or mistake."195 The court con-
cluded that, given the existing exceptions, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the
evidence did not outweigh the prejudice to the defendant. 196
The court assumed that the defendant's possession of porno-
graphic material and vaginal cream constituted "other crimes or
bad acts," but nevertheless found the defendant's possession of
these items was relevant to prove the commission of rape during
the time period referenced in the amended indictments. 197 The
victim testified at trial that the defendant played "tapes of
'grownups doing something' without clothes on and that he put
cream on her private parts.' The receipt for the vaginal cream
showed that it was purchased at a time when the victim's grand-
mother was at work, in an area the defendant had access to, and
at a time he was alone with the victim for several hours."99 The
pornographic tapes and vaginal cream, therefore, corroborated
the victim's allegations and also negated the possibility of acci-
dent or mistake. 200
On a related issue, the court held that the trial court properly
excluded evidence that the victim had made a false accusation
against another and only made the allegation against the defen-
dant because of the victim's mother.20 1 The court found that the
victim's prior allegations did not involve allegations of sexual in-
tercourse. 20 2 Instead, she had stated that the other man had
touched her vaginal area, but not "in a bad way."20 3 The other man
admitted touching the victim during playful roughhousing and
while tending to insect bites. 0 4
The court further rejected the alternative argument that the
defendant merely sought to impeach the victim with prior incon-
sistent statements as allowed by Clinebell v. Commonwealth.211
195. Id. at 715, 667 S.E.2d at 757.
196. See id. at 716-17, 667 S.E.2d at 758.
197. See id. at 715-17, 667 S.E.2d at 758.
198. Id. at 716, 667 S.E.2d at 758.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 719, 667 S.E.2d at 759-60.
202. Id. at 718, 667 S.E.2d at 759.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 717, 667 S.E.2d at 758.
205. See id. at 719-20, 667 S.E.2d at 760 (citing Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va.
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The court noted that, unlike the defendant in Clinebell, Ortiz had
not demonstrated a reasonable probability that any of the state-
ments were false. 20 6
C. Invited Error and the Ends of Justice
In Rowe v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with
the attempted capital murder of a police officer. 207 An off-duty po-
lice officer, while still in uniform, approached a truck that had
gone off the highway and into a ravine.208 The officer directed the
defendant to turn off the engine, and he complied. 209 As the officer
approached, the defendant restarted the truck and drove it direct-
ly at the officer, who fired his weapon until the truck stopped.210
The officer attempted to return to his vehicle but slipped.2 ' The
defendant then drove the truck directly at the officer a second
time, while the officer was fully illuminated by the truck's head-
lights, and the officer again began to fire his weapon at the
truck.212 The truck then turned away from the officer and fled the
scene. 213 The trial court, sitting without a jury, found the defen-
dant guilty.24 At trial, the defendant "advanced the assault
charge-the charge of which he was never indicted but eventually
convicted-as a more lenient alternative to the attempted murder
charge he was then facing and maintained that it was a lesser in-
cluded offense."215
In a post-verdict motion to reconsider, the trial court vacated
its judgment and found the defendant guilty of the assault and
battery of a law-enforcement officer.216 The defendant "acquiesced
without objection when the trial court accepted" the theory he
had advanced at trial.217 On appeal, the defendant asserted that
319, 321-22, 325, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264, 266 (1988)).
206. See id. at 719, 667 S.E.2d at 760.
207. 277 Va. 495, 500, 675 S.E.2d 161, 163 (2009).
208. See id. at 498, 675 S.E.2d at 162.
209. Id. at 499, 675 S.E.2d at 163.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 500, 675 S.E.2d at 163.
215. Id. at 502, 675 S.E.2d at 164-65.
216. Id. at 500, 675 S.E.2d at 163.
217. Id. at 502-03, 675 S.E.2d at 165.
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the trial court erred because assault is not a lesser included of-
fense of attempted murder.218 The Rowe court rejected the argu-
ment on procedural grounds, holding that the defendant could not
"now complain of the trial court's adoption of the legal theory he
introduced and repeatedly urged the trial court to adopt. 19
Undaunted, the defendant pressed his case by asserting that
the situation he had created constituted a miscarriage of justice
and that the "ends of justice" exception required the court to ad-
dress the matter on the merits.20 The court's dismissal of the ar-
gument provides guidance and insight as to what does not consti-
tute a "grave injustice or the denial of essential rights," either of
which is necessary for the invocation of the "ends of justice" ex-
ception. 221 Rowe clearly states that the ends of justice exception
will not be applied to review an error invited by a defendant.222
Refusing to consider an alleged error invited by a defendant un-
der the "ends of justice" does "not sanction . 'a grave injustice
or the denial of essential rights.' 223
D. Proving Predicate Crimes or Adjudications
Predictably, Virginia courts once again struggled with estab-
lishing prior adjudications based on flawed orders.
The defendant in Mwangi v. Commonwealth was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol as a second or subsequent
offense. 224 To prove one of the defendant's prior offenses, the pros-
ecution introduced a summons showing that he entered a guilty
plea, was tried and convicted, and was fined and sentenced to a
term in jail.22 5 However, the summons did not bear the signature
of a judge.226 The court found this defect fatal, holding that "[i]n a
218. See id. at 501, 675 S.E.2d at 164.
219. Id. at 503, 675 S.E.2d at 165.
220. See id.
221. See id. (quoting Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433
(2005)).
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Charles, 270 Va. at 17, 613 S.E.2d at 433).
224. See 277 Va. 393, 394, 672 S.E.2d 888, 889 (2009).
225. See id. at 394-95, 672 S.E.2d at 889.
226. Id. at 395, 672 S.E.2d at 889.
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court-not-of-record, a judge's signature proves the rendition of a
judgment."2 27
This result may surprise those who recall that in Jefferson v.
Commonwealth, the court held precisely the opposite:
The rendition of a judgment must be distinguished from its entry on
the court records. The rendition of a judgment duly pronounced is
the judicial act of the court, and the entry or recording of the in-
strument memorializing the judgment "does not constitute an
integral part of, and should not be confused with, the judgment it-
self." The absence of the judge's signature "does not invalidate the
judgment rendered."22
The Mwangi court does not cite or distinguish Jefferson. To be
sure, Jefferson considered a circuit court order rather than the
order of a court-not-of-record.229 It is not clear, however, why that
should make a difference as to the efficacy or existence of a judg-
ment.
In McMillan v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged the
admissibility of certain documents introduced to establish that he
was a convicted felon and, therefore, prohibited from possessing a
firearm. 230 To prove the prior conviction, the Commonwealth in-
troduced a petition filed in a juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court and a document captioned "Office Contacts & Court
Proceedings" that contained a number of notations by an un-
known scrivener. 231 The notations related to items such as the ap-
pointment of counsel and continuances. 232 One of those notations
was "ATTEMPT ARSON," along with a citation to the attempt
statute and the arson statute.23 A further notation provided: "1-3-
01 Def. present w/guardian & Atty. King. Def. offers a plea of
guilty. Waiver & stipulation of the evid. Ct. accepts plea. Ct. finds
def. guilty. Disposition 2-26-01. ''2- These documents were certified
by the court clerk as an authentic copy of a court record.235 McMil-
227. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 889-90.
228. 269 Va. 136, 139, 607 S.E.2d 107, 109 (quoting Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 617-
18, 139 S.E.2d 114, 117-18 (1964)).
229. See id. at 138, 607 S.E.2d at 109.
230. 277 Va. 11, 15, 671 S.E.2d 396, 397 (2009).
231. Id. at 20, 671 S.E.2d at 400.
232. See id. at 20-21, 671 S.E.2d at 400-01.
233. See id. at 20, 671 S.E.2d at 400.
234. Id. at 21, 671 S.E.2d at 400-01.
235. See id. at 30, 671 S.E.2d at 406.
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lan contended that the documents did not establish the crime for
which he pled guilty.2 36
The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that when a prior
conviction is an element of an offense, it must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and cannot be left to conjecture.237 In the court's
view, the notes introduced at trial indicated, at best, that the de-
fendant pled guilty to an offense-not that the defendant was
convicted of a felony.238 Therefore, the documents were irrelevant
and should not have been admitted.239 Three justices dissented
from this holding.24°
McMillan suggests that prosecutors will have a difficult time
establishing a prior conviction using anything other than a court
order. Even then, the order must be signed if it originates from a
court-not-of-record.
V. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Aggravated Involuntary Manslaughter/Felony Homicide
In Payne v. Commonwealth, the defendant contended that her
conviction for felony homicide and aggravated involuntary man-
slaughter improperly placed her in double jeopardy because both
convictions were predicated upon the death of a single victim.241
After a day of drinking on the job, the defendant drove away from
her employer's parking lot and promptly collided with a car that
was stopped at a red light.242 The defendant then drove away,
swerving erratically, and within a short distance, struck and
killed a pedestrian. 243 The defendant again drove away. 24"
The court employed the Blockburger test to determine whether
the defendant's convictions violated the constitutional protections
236. See id. at 21, 671 S.E.2d at 401.
237. Id. at 24, 671 S.E.2d at 402.
238. Id. at 27, 671 S.E.2d at 404.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See 277 Va. 531, 538, 674 S.E.2d 835, 838 (2009).
242. See id. at 536, 674 S.E.2d at 837.
243. See id. at 536-37, 674 S.E.2d at 837.
244. See id. at 537, 674 S.E.2d at 837.
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against double jeopardy.2 5 The court observed that in this in-
stance, "each offense requires proof of an element which the other
does not."246 Specifically,
[to convict under the felony homicide statute, the Commonwealth
must prove that the defendant committed the killing in the commis-
sion of a felonious act; however, the Commonwealth is not required
to prove any level of intoxication or recklessness. To convict under
the aggravated involuntary manslaughter statute, the Common-
wealth must prove intoxication and recklessness; however, the
Commonwealth is not required to prove that the defendant commit-
ted the killing in the commission of a felonious act.247
Therefore, the court held, the defendant was properly convicted
of two offenses, notwithstanding the fact that both crimes in-
volved a single victim. 248
B. Burglary and Burglarious Tools
The defendant in Giles v. Commonwealth argued that the pros-
ecution did not meet its burden of proving that the house in ques-
tion was a "dwelling house" for purposes of the burglary statute. 24 9
The owner of the house stayed at the house at least once or twice
per month. 25 0 The pantry and refrigerator were stocked with food,
and the water and power utilities were operational. 251 Additional-
ly, six rooms in the house were furnished.252
The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that "[t]he focus has
been and remains on the manner in which the place is used."253
The court set forth the following standard to assist lower courts
in determining whether a house is a "dwelling house":
245. See id. at 540, 674 S.E.2d at 839 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932)). The Blockburger test is defined as follows: when the same criminal con-
duct violates more than one statute, the offenses are different if each requires proof of an
element that the other does not. Id. If each requires proof of an element the other does not,
then neither can be included within the other. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 541, 674 S.E.2d at 840.
248. See id.
249. 277 Va. 369, 372, 672 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2009).
250. Id. at 371, 672 S.E.2d at 881.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 374, 672 S.E.2d at 882.
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[A] house is a dwelling house pursuant to Code § 18.2-89 when the
house is used for habitation, including periodic habitation. Periodic
habitation does not require that the house be used at regular inter-
vals. Rather, periodic habitation requires that when the house is
used, it is used for the purpose of habitation. Thus, a dwelling house
is a house that one uses for habitation, as opposed to another pur-
pose.
Although the Commonwealth is not required to prove a structure is
inhabited at regular intervals, it must provide sufficient evidence
that the structure is used as a habitation to satisfy the "dwelling
house" requirement of Code § 18.2-89. The circuit court must analyze
the evidence presented to ascertain if there are sufficient indicia of
habitation and actual use as a place of habitation for the structure to
be deemed a dwelling house.
25 4
Assessing the evidence under this standard, the court found
that the house qualified as a dwelling house: it was regularly in-
habited, it was furnished, utilities were connected, food was
stocked in the pantry and refrigerator, and sheets, towels, and
toiletries were all present.255
Johns v. Commonwealth offers a useful counterpoint to Giles.256
In Johns, a house was burglarized at a time when it was uninha-
bited and in the process of renovation.2 57 The electricity was dis-
connected, and no furniture was present in the home.28 A burglar
broke into the home and stole some tools. 259 Like the defendant in
Giles, Johns argued that he could not be convicted of statutory
burglary because the structure in question was not a "dwelling
house."260 Applying the framework from Giles, the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia concluded that the house in question did not
qualify as a "dwelling house" because no one currently or recently
resided there, the house was completely unfurnished, and no elec-
tricity was connected to the home.261
254. Id. at 375, 672 S.E.2d at 883.
255. See id. at 375-76, 672 S.E.2d at 883-84.
256. See 53 Va. App. 742, 675 S.E.2d 211 (Ct. App. 2009).
257. See id. at 744, 675 S.E.2d at 212.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 744-45, 675 S.E.2d at 213.
260. Id. at 746, 675 S.E.2d at 213.
261. See id. at 748-49, 675 S.E.2d at 214-15.
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A different burglary conundrum arose in Lacey v. Common-
wealth.262 There, the defendant entered the open garage of a home
and opened a door leading to the inside of the house.263 Once in-
side, Lacey stole some cash and fled. 26 He argued that because
the "breaking" element that is required for a burglary conviction
occurred within the dwelling house, he could not be convicted of
burglary.265
In addressing the issue, the Court of Appeals of Virginia ob-
served that Lacey did not commit a "breaking" by entering the
garage through the open door.266 Furthermore, the court noted
that "the breaking of a room within a dwelling house does not
constitute the breaking of a dwelling as required by the burglary
statutes; rather, only the breaking and entering from outside the
dwelling into the dwelling suffices. '267 Therefore, the key to the
outcome was "whether a garage attached to a house represents
part of the dwelling ... 268
The court found persuasive the holdings of other courts that a
garage is part of the residence.2 69 The court concluded that an at-
tached garage is part of the dwelling, noting that it is structurally
connected to the dwelling and is used for daily living. 20 Because
the defendant broke into an interior room, the statutory element
of an outside "breaking" was not satisfied, and the court reversed
his burglary conviction. 271
Whether a purse constitutes a "burglarious tool" was at issue in
Edwards v. Commonwealth.272 The defendant was caught stealing
clothing by stuffing it into a large purse. 2 3 She was convicted of
262. See 54 Va. App. 32, 675 S.E.2d 846 (Ct. App. 2009).
263. See id. at 34-35, 675 S.E.2d at 848.
264. See id. at 35, 675 S.E.2d at 848.
265. See id. at 34, 675 S.E.2d at 848.
266. Id. at 44, 675 S.E.2d at 852.
267. Id. at 40, 675 S.E.2d at 850 (citing Hitt v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 473, 477,
481, 598 S.E.2d 783, 784-85, 787 (Ct. App. 2004)).
268. See id. at 41, 675 S.E.2d at 851.
269. See id. at 41-43, 675 S.E.2d at 851-52 ("[T]he record reveals the [attached] garage
... [was] separated from the living quarters by a door. The same roof covered the garage
as the rest of the residence. The living quarters surrounded the garage on two sides. It
was structurally no different from any other room in the residence." (quoting State v.
Wills, 696 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 2005))).
270. See id. at 43, 675 S.E.2d at 852.
271. See id. at 44, 675 S.E.2d at 852.
272. See 53 Va. App. 402, 405, 672 S.E.2d 894, 895 (Ct. App. 2009) (en banc).
273. Id. at 404, 672 S.E.2d at 895.
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possessing a burglarious tool with the intent to commit larceny.274
On appeal, she argued that a purse is not "innately burglarious"
as required by the statute and, second, even if the statute does
not require for a tool to be "innately burglarious," a purse is not a
"tool, implement or outfit."27
Virginia Code section 18.2-94 provides as follows:
[i]f any person [has] in his possession any tools, implements or outfit,
with intent to commit burglary, robbery or larceny, upon conviction
thereof he shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. The possession of such
burglarious tools, implements or outfit by any person other than a li-
censed dealer, shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to commit
burglary, robbery or larceny 276
The Court of Appeals of Virginia parsed the language of the
statute and prior precedents to conclude that the statute does not
require burglarious tools to be innately burglarious.2 77 Second, the
court concluded that "an ordinary purse is neither a 'tool' nor an
'implement.' 278 The court had previously defined a tool as 'an in-
strument (as a hammer or saw) [sic] used or worked by hand,' or
'an implement or object used in performing an operation or carry-
ing on work of any kind.' 21 9 The court noted that implements are
"'items associated with devices, instruments, equipment or ma-
chinery as they relate to an occupation or profession.'"280 The court
then turned to whether a purse might constitute an "outfit."28 1
The court had previously defined an "outfit" as "'(1) the act or
process of fitting out or equipping, (2) materials, tools, or imple-
ments comprising the equipment necessary for carrying out a
particular project, and (3) wearing apparel designed to be worn on
a special occasion or in a particular situation.' 28 2 The court repu-
diated the third definition of outfit, reasoning that it would lead
to absurd results and is inconsistent with the other two defini-
274. See id. at 403, 672 S.E.2d at 894.
275. Id. at 403, 405, 672 S.E.2d at 894-95.
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-94 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
277. See id. at 408-09, 672 S.E.2d at 897.
278. Id. at 410, 672 S.E.2d at 897.
279. Id. at 409, 672 S.E.2d at 897 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App.
337, 343, 649 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ct. App. 2007)).
280. Id. (quoting Williams, 50 Va. App. at 345, 649 S.E.2d at 721).
281. Id. at 405-06, 672 S.E.2d at 895.
282. Id. at 410, 672 S.E.2d at 898 (quoting Mercer v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 380,
384, 512 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ct. App. 1999)).
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tions.2 83 Therefore, the court held that "the appropriate definition
of 'outfit' is 'the articles forming an equipment' or 'the tools or in-
struments comprised in any special equipment .... '4 Under this
definition, a purse is not an "outfit."25
C. Disrupting a Public Meeting
Howard v. Commonwealth provides another illustration of
Winston Churchill's quip that democracy is the worst possible
system, except for all the others.Hs In that case, the Roanoke City
Council held an emotionally charged meeting to determine
whether to renovate or demolish a memorial dedicated to World
War II veterans.2 7 The mayor admonished one of the speakers
when the speaker said that the letter "L" in the mayor's middle
name stood for "liar."288 In response, Howard yelled loudly "let
him speak, let him speak."289 Thus interrupted, the mayor called a
recess so Howard could be removed. 290 A police officer then asked
Howard if he would be a "gentleman" and walk out as a "full-
grown adult[ ] ."91 Howard refused, claiming a right to speak.29 2 He
also told the officer, "if you want me out of here, you have to drag
me out."23 The officer obliged by applying a "wristlock" and forc-
ing Howard to leave.29 Howard was ultimately convicted of violat-
ing a Roanoke municipal ordinance that provided:
"(a) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent to
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creat-
ing a risk thereof, he:
283. See id. at 410-11, 672 S.E.2d at 898.
284. Id. at 411-12, 672 S.E.2d at 898 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1733 (2d ed. 1955)).
285. See id. at 412, 672 S.E.2d at 898-99.
286. See 277 Va. 184, 671 S.E.2d 156 (2009); Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of
Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 221 (6th ed.
2004) ("No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time.").
287. See Howard, 277 Va. at 187, 671 S.E.2d at 157.
288. See id.
289. Id. at 187-88, 671 S.E.2d at 157.
290. See id. at 188, 671 S.E.2d at 157-58.
291. Id. at 188, 671 S.E.2d at 157.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id., 671 S.E.2d at 158.
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(2) Wilfully... disrupts any meeting of the city council... if such
disruption interferes with the orderly conduct of such meeting... ;
provided, however, such conduct shall not be deemed to include the
utterance or display of any words."
295
The language of this ordinance parallels Virginia Code section
18.2-415 .296
The defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that he
could not be convicted under the ordinance merely for uttering
words. 297 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendant's
actions had caused the recess, and that his removal had disrupted
the meeting. 29 The court also had no difficulty concluding that
the defendant's conduct was willful and affirmed his conviction. 29
D. Driving While Intoxicated
In Ratliff v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged her con-
viction under Virginia Code section 18.2-51.4. 300 That section pro-
hibits anyone from "'driving while intoxicated... in a manner so
gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for
human life, unintentionally caus[ing] the serious bodily injury of
another person resulting in permanent and significant physical
impairment.' 30 1 The defendant, drawing her definition of "intox-
icated" from Virginia Code section 4.1-100, contended that she
could be prosecuted only if she had been intoxicated from alco-
hol-not drugs.302
The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this argument.30 3 The
court reasoned that Virginia Code section 18.2-266, which is refe-
renced in Virginia Code section 18.2-51.4, expressly provides that
a person can be intoxicated from drugs.30 4 Had the General As-
sembly intended to limit the definition of "intoxicated," the court
295. Id. at 186, 671 S.E.2d at 156-57 (quoting Roanoke, Va., Ordinance 38500, § 21-9
(June 15, 2009)).
296. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
297. See Howard, 277 Va. at 189, 671 S.E.2d at 158.
298. See id. at 191-92, 671 S.E.2d at 159-60.
299. See id. at 192, 671 S.E.2d at 160.
300. See 53 Va. App. 443, 445, 672 S.E.2d 913, 914 (Ct. App. 2009).
301. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-51.4 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
302. Id. at 446, 672 S.E.2d at 915.
303. Id.
304. See id.
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noted, it would have done so as it has in the context of the invo-
luntary manslaughter statute."° Virginia Code section 4.1-100, it
held, is expressly limited to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.3 16
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the de-
finition of intoxicated in Gardner v. Commonwealth controlled the
outcome, because nothing in that case purported to limit the defi-
nition of "intoxicated" to alcohol.30 7
E. Drug Offenses
In Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia addressed the liability of principals in the second degree for a
drug distribution scheme. 08 When police raided a house in
Portsmouth, they discovered thirteen bags of crack cocaine.3 9 In
the room where the drugs were discovered, the police found pa-
pers belonging to the defendant, as well as papers belonging to
the defendant's boyfriend, Wilkins.3' Police also found packaging
materials, as well as scales and a razor in other parts of the
house. 311
Brickhouse stated that she knew why the police were there and
that "she wasn't the one doing it."312 She also admitted she had
seen Wilkins with bags of cocaine at the residence.3 13 Brickhouse
said she lived there with her aunt and uncle.34 She admitted that
her boyfriend had a key to the house and that he had been in the
house without her.315 Her fingerprints were not found on the
drugs or the drug paraphernalia, nor was any incriminating evi-
dence found on her person.3 16 She denied any knowledge of drugs
being stored at the house. 31 7 Significantly, the prosecution did not
305. Id. at 447, 672 S.E.2d at 915.
306. Id. at 448, 672 S.E.2d at 915-16.
307. See id. at 448-50, 672 S.E.2d at 916-17 (citing Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195
Va. 945, 954, 81 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1954)).
308. 276 Va. 682, 684, 668 S.E.2d 160, 161 (2008).
309. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 161-62.
310. Id. at 684-85, 668 S.E.2d at 162.
311. Id. at 685, 668 S.E.2d at 162.
312. Id. at 684, 668 S.E.2d at 162.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 685, 668 S.E.2d at 162.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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present evidence concerning who owned, rented, or had legal pos-
session of the residence.3 18
The court concluded that this evidence was not sufficient to
convict Brickhouse, reasoning that
[g]iven that the principal in the first degree is unknown, and it was
not proven that Brickhouse had exclusive control and authority over
the residence where the drugs were found, the circumstantial evi-
dence presented by the Commonwealth failed to exclude all reasona-
ble inferences inconsistent with Brickhouse's guilt as a principal in
the second degree. Even if Brickhouse knew the drugs were being
stored at the residence, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
she is the person who permitted it, as opposed to another resident.
3 1 9
Dunn v. Commonwealth offers a useful contrast to Brick-
house.2 0 In Dunn, the defendant shared a house with her boy-
friend, a drug dealer, and she was present when he sold metham-
phetamine to an undercover officer.3 21 When the police later
obtained a search warrant and searched the house, the defendant
was present and seated next to scales, rolling papers, and a de-
vice containing marijuana residue. 322 In various places in the liv-
ing room and kitchen, police found marijuana, methampheta-
mine, and various items connected to the drugs, such as smoking
devices. 23
Dunn admitted she knew that "dope" was in the house and that
it was being sold there.124 The defendant's boyfriend testified that
neither he nor the defendant had a job, and that the drug sales
provided income for the couple.32 1 Both used "pinches" from the
methamphetamine to support their drug habits.3 26
The Court of Appeals of Virginia found this evidence sufficient
to support a conviction for possession of drugs with the intent to
distribute as a principal in the second degree. 327 The court held
that
318. Id.
319. Id. at 687, 668 S.E.2d at 163.
320. See 52 Va. App. 611, 665 S.E.2d 868 (Ct. App. 2008) (en banc).
321. See id. at 614, 665 S.E.2d at 869.
322. Id. at 615, 665 S.E.2d at 869.
323. See id. at 615-16, 665 S.E.2d at 869-70.
324. Id. at 616, 665 S.E.2d at 870.
325. Id. at 616-17, 665 S.E.2d at 870.
326. Id. at 617, 665 S.E.2d at 870.
327. See id.
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Dunn's consent to the drug sales in her home, her reliance on the in-
come from the marijuana sales for her livelihood, and her reliance on
the pinches from the methamphetamine to support her own drug ha-
bit supplied the "other circumstances" from which the jury, as the
trier of fact to whom we must defer, could infer Dunn "assented" to
the possession of the drugs with intent to distribute and "lent to it
[her] countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding and abet-
ting the same.3
28
Dunaway v. Commonwealth addresses several important
points for drug prosecutions. 32 9 First, the court held that amend-
ing an indictment to increase the amount of a drug being distri-
buted was permissible because it did not change the nature or
character of the crime charged.330 Specifically, the original indict-
ment charged the defendant with running "a continuing criminal
enterprise engaged, over the course of a year, in the distribution,
or possession with the intent to distribute, of 'at least 2.5 kilo-
grams but less than 5 kilograms of a mixture containing cocaine
base... in violation of [Virginia Code] § 18.2-248(H1).' ' '331
Subsequent to the indictment, the prosecution acquired addi-
tional evidence that the amount was five kilograms or greater. 332
The court allowed the prosecution to amend the indictment.3 33 The
court held that amending the indictment "did not alter the essen-
tial, underlying conduct on the part of appellant that was charged
in the original indictment-that is to say, '[t]he overt acts consti-
tuting the crime [remained] the same.' ... [T]he amendment
merely subjected appellant to a higher mandatory minimum pu-
nishment for the same offense."1 4 Dunaway specifically rejected
the argument that an increase in punishment was the same as
adding a new charge, which would be impermissible . 35
Dunaway also simplified the prosecution's task in cases where
the Commonwealth cannot rely on laboratory testing to deter-
328. Id. at 621, 665 S.E.2d at 872 (quoting Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82,
94, 428 S.E.2d 16, 25 (Ct. App. 1993)).
329. See 52 Va. App. 281, 663 S.E.2d 117 (Ct. App. 2008)
330. Id. at 298, 663 S.E.2d at 126.
331. Id. at 295, 663 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(H1)(3) (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
332. Id. at 292, 663 S.E.2d at 123.
333. Id. at 292-93, 663 S.E.2d at 123.
334. Id. at 297, 663 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 867,
876, 161 S.E. 297, 300 (1931)).
335. Id. at 298, 663 S.E.2d at 126-26.
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mine the nature of the substance. Nearly all of the Common-
wealth's witnesses in Dunaway referred to the substance involved
as "crack."33 6 The prosecutor called a chemist who testified that
"crack" is a common name for cocaine or cocaine base.337 The Du-
naway court discussed several federal decisions regarding "crack"
and concluded that it would join the "universal agreement" in re-
cognizing that "crack" was the same as cocaine base.3 s Thereaf-
ter, the court reaffirmed the long-established rule in Virginia that
when "a substance cannot be 'recovered, tested or introduced into
evidence,' its nature 'can be proved by proof of the circumstances
and effects of its use,"' which includes the testimony of lay wit-
nesses based on their "familiarity or experience" with the drug.3 39
The defendant in Dunaway also raised a cruel and unusual pu-
nishment claim because he had been sentenced to life without pa-
role.340 The panel had little trouble in rejecting the claim under
the United States Constitution and Virginia's Constitution.31 Du-
naway noted that the United States Supreme Court had found
"the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without possibility of
parole for the possession of a mere 672 grams of cocaine did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment."3 42 Therefore, the Du-
naway panel could not "say that appellant's similar punishment
for a more severe crime [distribution of greater than five kilo-
grams of cocaine] is grossly disproportionate to the crime."343
Omissions and oversights in orders can inure to the benefit of
defendants. For example, in White v. Commonwealth, the court
placed the defendant on first offender status on December 21,
2004.344 An express condition of her first offender disposition was
336. See id. at 302-03, 663 S.E.2d at 127-28.
337. See id. at 301, 663 S.E.2d at 127.
338. See id. at 300-01, 663 S.E.2d at 126-27.
339. Id. at 301, 663 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 60, 63, 379
S.E.2d 134, 136 (1989)). The witnesses testified that the substance sold during the course
of the period charged in the indictment was crack cocaine. Id. at 302-03, 663 S.E.2d at
127-28. Dunaway also noted the lack of evidence regarding complaints from buyers or us-
ers of the drugs sold, who had paid high prices for the drugs. Id. at 302-04, 663 S.E.2d at
127-28.
340. Id. at 310, 663 S.E.2d at 132.
341. Id. at 311, 663 S.E.2d at 132.
342. Id. at 312, 663 S.E.2d at 132 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-94
(1991)).
343. Id. at 313, 663 S.E.2d at 133.
344. See 276 Va. 725, 728, 667 S.E.2d 564, 565 (2008).
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that she demonstrate "good behavior."45 At a hearing on Decem-
ber 21, 2005, the trial court found that the defendant had satis-
fied all conditions set forth in the December 21, 2004, order, ex-
cept the payment of court costs.36 The trial court continued the
matter for six months "to check the status of payment."94 The De-
cember 21, 2005, order was silent regarding continuing super-
vised probation348 Nevertheless, the probation officer continued to
monitor the defendant, and the defendant tested positive on sev-
eral occasions after December 21, 2005, for drugs349 The court
scheduled a revocation hearing regarding the defendant's first of-
fender status and revoked that status on August 2, 2006.350 The
court acknowledged that a condition of good behavior is generally
implied.3 5, However, the court held that this principle did not ap-
ply because the trial court had made good behavior an express
condition of probation in the original order, but did not continue
that requirement past December 21, 2005.352
First offender dispositions are common, and White establishes
that prosecutors and trial judges need to be cognizant of what is
in the original order. If there is any need to continue the matter,
the continuance order must expressly indicate which conditions
are being continued.3 53 This should include some indication of
whether first offender status is also being continued or whether
that has ended. In reversing and dismissing the case, the White
court expressly rejected the Commonwealth's arguments that
first offender status and probation extended past December 21,
2005. 354 Instead, White held that the 2004 order granting the de-
fendant first offender status explicitly stated that the defendant's
probation ended on December 21, 2005.155
345. See id.
346. See id. at 729, 667 S.E.2d at 565.
347. See id. at 729, 667 S.E.2d at 565-66.
348. Id. at 729, 667 S.E.2d at 566.
349. See id.
350. Id.
351. See id. at 731, 667 S.E.2d at 567.
352. See id.
353. See id. 732-33, 667 S.E.2d at 567-68.
354. See id. at 732-33, 667 S.E.2d at 568.
355. Id. at 733, 667 S.E.2d at 568.
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F. Felony Hit and Run
The felony hit and run statute provides that
[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident.., in which an at-
tended vehicle ... is damaged shall immediately stop as close to the
scene of the accident as possible ... and report his name, address,
driver's license number, and vehicle registration number forthwith
to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency... or to the driv-
er or some other occupant of the vehicle collided with... 356
The defendant in Milazzo v. Commonwealth contended that he
could not be convicted of felony hit and run because his ramming
of a police vehicle was intentional, and thus, "he was not involved
in an 'accident.'' 357 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
argument, noting that the purpose of the statute was to protect
persons who are injured during the course of "an unfortunate ve-
hicular event."358 An accident, the court concluded, can stem from
either deliberate or unintended conduct. 59 The court further rea-
soned that the purpose of the statute was to protect innocent per-
sons.360 Therefore, "it makes no difference whether the collision
was intentional or unintentional."36 1 The court concluded that an
accident had occurred, regardless of the fact that the defendant's
conduct was intentional.36
G. Malicious Wounding
In Blow v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
applied the doctrine of transferred intent to affirm a malicious
wounding conviction. 363 During a domestic altercation, as the de-
fendant was stabbing his wife, their daughter intervened .3 1 The
defendant, still trying to stab his wife, cut his daughter's hand.36
The defendant was convicted of maliciously wounding his daugh-
356. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-894 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
357. 276 Va. 734, 736-37, 668 S.E.2d 158, 159-60 (2008).
358. See id. at 738, 668 S.E.2d at 160.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. Id.
362. See id.
363. See 52 Va. App. 533, 547, 665 S.E.2d 254, 261 (Ct. App. 2008).
364. See id. at 536, 665 S.E.2d at 255.
365. Id.
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ter.3 66 The defendant argued that the doctrine of transferred in-
tent did not apply because he had already been convicted of the
malicious wounding of his wife. 367 He also argued that his daugh-
ter's attempt to aid her mother caused the injury.36s The court
disagreed, reasoning that the defendant created the situation and
his daughter's intervention was a foreseeable event. 69 Second, al-
though states are divided on the issue, a majority upheld the ap-
plication of the doctrine of transferred intent "when any harm
comes to an unintended victim as a result of a defendant's voli-
tional act."370
The defendant in Blow was not finished after stabbing his wife
and daughter. He was spotted by the police and a high-speed
chase ensued.371 During the chase, the defendant intentionally
struck an officer's car several times before the defendant spun out
and hit a wall.3 72 The defendant maintained that the evidence
supported the reasonable hypothesis that he was merely trying to
flee.373 The court found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning
that the defendant,
while attempting to flee, led the officers on a dangerous, high-speed,
twenty-eight-mile-long car chase. During this chase, [the defendant]
drove recklessly on busy highways, changed lanes erratically, and
made illegal u-turns. Despite the lengthy chase, [the defendant] was
unable to escape.., and was about to be forced to a stop. From these
facts the trial court could reasonably infer that [the defendant] in-
tended to prevent this from happening by deliberately crashing into
[the officer's] car. This act would "obviously cause a serious wreck,
maiming, disfiguring, disabling or killing anyone involved in it."
3 74
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals affirmed a
conviction for malicious wounding where the injury was inflicted
by a single blow from a fist. 375 The defendant had attacked a pros-
366. Id. at 535, 665 S.E.2d at 255.
367. Id. at 540-41, 665 S.E.2d at 257-58.
368. Id. at 542, 665 S.E.2d at 258.
369. Id. at 542-43, 665 S.E.2d at 258-59.
370. Id. at 545, 665 S.E.2d at 260.
371. See id. at 537, 665 S.E.2d at 255-56.
372. Id. at 537-38, 665 S.E.2d at 256.
373. See id. at 539, 665 S.E.2d at 257.
374. Id. at 540, 665 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827,
833, 531 S.E.2d 41, 43 (Ct. App. 2000)).
375. See 53 Va. App. 79, 87, 669 S.E.2d 368, 372 (Ct. App. 2009).
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ecutor by punching him in the head.376 The prosecutor fell to the
ground, the defendant was subdued, and medical personnel were
called to treat the prosecutor2 77 The prosecutor "suffered a con-
cussion, two cuts in his ear, one of which required four stitches,
and soreness in his shoulder lasting for several weeks."378 The de-
fendant subsequently made numerous statements expressing
pride about the injuries he had inflicted.37 9
The Johnson court acknowledged that ordinarily a single blow
would not be a sufficient basis for finding the requisite intent of
permanent injury.3 ° However, the particular facts in this attack,
which included an unprovoked, defenseless victim, a blow to the
head, and the tremendous force with which the defendant struck
the victim, warranted a finding that the defendant had attacked
with the intent to inflict a permanent injury.3 81
H. Sex Offender Registration
Given the constant movement of persons across state lines, is-
sues are bound to arise with respect to the legal effect that should
be given to prior criminal convictions. In Johnson v. Common-
wealth, the defendant contended that he should not have been
convicted for failure to register as a sex offender in Virginia be-
cause his North Carolina convictions were not "substantially sim-
ilar" to Virginia crimes that require registration.382 Johnson was
convicted in North Carolina of aiding and abetting a second-
degree rape and a second-degree sex offense.3 83 In analyzing the
claim, the Court of Appeals of Virginia first relied on the re-
quirement that the provisions of the sex offender registry are to
be liberally construed.3 11 Second, the court observed that registra-
tion is required in Virginia if an offense committed in another
state is "similar" to a Virginia offense that requires registration-
376. Id.
377. See id.
378. Id.
379. See id.
380. See id. at 103, 669 S.E.2d at 380.
381. See id. at 103-04, 669 S.E.2d at 380.
382. 53 Va. App. 608, 609-10, 674 S.E.2d 541, 541-42 (Ct. App. 2009).
383. Id. at 610, 674 S.E.2d at 542.
384. See id. at 611, 674 S.E.2d at 542 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-920 (Repl. Vol.
2006)).
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a substantial similarity between the Virginia offense and the oth-
er state's offense is not required under the plain language of the
applicable Virginia Code section 85 Comparing the two statutes,
the court observed that the Virginia rape statute is broader than
the North Carolina statute. 6 As a result, "any act which results
in a conviction of second-degree rape under North Carolina law
would necessarily result in a conviction of rape in Virginia."3 87 Fi-
nally, the court made short work of the defendant's argument
that only a principal in the first degree should be required to reg-
ister.3 Such a stricture, the court reasoned, would be inconsis-
tent with the statute's mandate of liberal construction and the
fact that the law treats principals in the second degree the same
way as principals in the first degree.38
I. Solicitation to Commit Murder and Attempted Murder
The defendant in Ostrander v. Commonwealth was convicted of
both solicitation to commit murder and attempted capital murder
for hire.3 90 Ostrander previously entered a guilty plea to the
charge of solicitation and contended that the Double Jeopardy
Clause precluded a subsequent prosecution for attempted capital
murder.3 91 The Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that double
jeopardy imposed no bar to a conviction for attempted capital
murder.192
The court first rejected the argument that the defendant's
guilty plea, followed by a trial on the remaining charge, consti-
tuted separate prosecutions for the "same offense."3 93 Relying on
settled precedent, the court concluded that "a defendant's election
to plead guilty at trial to one charge and not guilty to another
charge arising from the same criminal act 'neither "transform[s]
the single prosecution into two separate prosecutions nor cap-
385. See id. at 613-14, 674 S.E.2d at 543-44 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-902 (Cum.
Supp. 2009)).
386. Id. at 615, 674 S.E.2d at 544.
387. Id.
388. See id. at 615-16, 674 S.E.2d at 544.
389. See id.
390. 51 Va. App. 386, 391, 658 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2008).
391. Id. at 389, 658 S.E.2d at 347.
392. See id. at 394, 658 S.E.2d at 350.
393. See id. at 392-93, 658 S.E.2d at 349.
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ture[s] for [the defendant] any special protections against succes-
sive prosecutions under the [Diouble [Jleopardy [C]lause."' 3 94 The
court then turned to whether the defendant was twice subjected
to prosecution for the same offense395 The test is "'whether each
[offense] requires proof of a fact which the other does not.'"3 16 This
test considers the elements of the two offenses "'in the abstract,
rather than in the context of the facts of the particular case being
reviewed.' 397
The court noted that "[tihe offense of attempted capital murder
for hire requires proof of a fact that the offense of solicitation to
commit murder does not-namely, that the accused performed a
direct act toward the commission of the contemplated murder."398
The attempted capital murder statute contains two distinct pro-
visions: it "allows an accused to be convicted of capital murder for
hire if he either hires someone to do the killing or does the killing
himself after having been hired by someone else to do it."199 In the
second scenario, where the hired killer commits the murder, the
killer clearly could not be convicted of solicitation.400 Therefore,
"when considered in the abstract without reference to the particu-
lar facts . . , a solicitation to commit murder conviction requires
proof of a fact that an attempted capital murder for hire convic-
tion does not-namely, that the accused solicited another person
to commit a murder."401 Consequently, the court held, the two of-
fenses are not the "same offense" and the defendant suffered no
deprivation of his protection against double jeopardy. 40 2
J. Failure to Appear
The defendant in Bowling v. Commonwealth pled guilty to a
charge of driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana
394. Id. at 393, 658 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting Rea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 940,
944, 421 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1992)).
395. Id. at 395, 658 S.E.2d at 350.
396. Id. (quoting West v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr., 273 Va. 56, 63, 639 S.E.2d 190, 195
(2007)).
397. Id. at 396, 658 S.E.2d at 350 (quoting West, 273 Va. 63, 639 S.E.2d at 195).
398. Id., 658 S.E.2d at 351.
399. Id. at 397, 658 S.E.2d at 351 (citation omitted).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. See id.
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with the intent to distribute.4°3 However, he failed to appear for
his sentencing proceeding.40 4 After he was apprehended, he was
convicted of failing to appear. 40 5 The defendant observed that the
failure to appear statute criminalized a willful failure to appear
for persons who are "charged" with a felony.4 6 Because he pled
guilty, he contended, he was not "charged" with a felony but ra-
ther was "convicted" of a felony.4 7 The Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia disagreed, reasoning that the defendant's guilty plea did not
alter the fact that he remained charged with a crime. 41 The court
also rejected the defendant's interpretation on the ground that it
would lead to absurd results .40
K. Felony Escape
The sufficiency of the evidence for a felony escape charge was
at issue in Hubbard v. Commonwealth.41' The defendant, seeking
to avoid a traffic stop, engaged in a high-speed pursuit with the
police.411 He eventually fled on foot.412 A fight ensued between
Hubbard and the police officer, who eventually managed to sub-
due him.413 Hubbard was charged with, and convicted of, felonious
escape from custody.41' The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed
this conviction. 415 The statute provides that "if any person lawful-
ly in the custody of any police officer on a charge of criminal of-
fense escapes from such custody by force or violence, he shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony."416
The court held that the Commonwealth must prove, as an ele-
ment of this offense, that the defendant was charged with a crim-
403. 51 Va. App. 102, 104, 654 S.E.2d 354, 355 (Ct. App. 2007).
404. Id. at 105, 654 S.E.2d at 355.
405. See id.
406. See id. at 107-08, 654 S.E.2d at 357 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-128(B) (Repl.
Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009)).
407. Id.
408. See id. at 108, 654 S.E.2d at 357.
409. See id. at 110, 654 S.E.2d at 358.
410. 276 Va. 292, 293, 661 S.E.2d 464, 465 (2008).
411. See id. at 294, 661 S.E.2d at 466.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. Id. at 297, 661 S.E.2d at 467.
416. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-478 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (emphasis added).
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inal offense before the escape occurred. 4" The evidence was insuf-
ficient here because no criminal charge was pending at the time
of the defendant's flight from the police.418 The court reasoned
that probable cause to arrest for an offense is not the same as a
criminal charge.419 Instead, a charge is a "formal accusation" or a
"formal written complaint" of a crime. 420 The Commonwealth had
presented no evidence of a criminal charge and, therefore, failed
to establish this element of the offense.4 2'
L. Forcible Sodomy and Aggravated Sexual Battery
Bowden v. Commonwealth demonstrates the need for prosecu-
tors to consider (1) which, if any, other offenses should be charged
within the indictment and (2) why some seemingly similar
charges, such as forcible sodomy and sexual battery, are distinct
for double jeopardy purposes.422 In Bowden, the defendant argued
that the Commonwealth had failed to establish penetration,
which is necessary to prove forcible sodomy.423 The prosecutor
countered that even if penetration had not been proven, the de-
fendant could still be convicted of the lesser-included offense of
aggravated sexual battery.424 The trial judge agreed.425
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial court erred in
finding aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of
forcible sodomy.426 The court of appeals agreed and reversed the
conviction. 427 The court analyzed the elements of both offenses in
the abstract to determine if aggravated sexual battery contained
an element that forcible sodomy did not.42 As the Commonwealth
admitted on appeal, forcible sodomy required proof of penetration,
417. See Hubbard, 276 Va. at 295, 661 S.E.2d at 466.
418. See id. at 296, 661 S.E.2d at 467.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. Id.
422. 52 Va. App. 673, 667 S.E.2d 27 (Ct. App. 2008).
423. Id. at 675, 667 S.E.2d at 28.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 678, 667 S.E.2d at 29.
428. See id. at 676-77, 667 S.E.2d at 28-29.
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while sexual battery only required proof that the defendant
touched the clothing covering a victim's intimate parts.429
M. Indecent Liberties
The Supreme Court of Virginia generally has adhered to the
rule of statutory construction regarding the plain meaning of the
words used in statutes. In Sadler v. Commonwealth, a softball
coach, who was not associated with a school program, was con-
victed of indecent liberties with a minor with whom he main-
tained a custodial or supervisory relationship.430 The victim, a se-
venteen-year-old female, was a member of the coach's traveling
softball team. 431 The coach went to the player's residence, knowing
that she was alone, and gave her cards and presents for her and
her family. 432 The coach then kissed the player and rubbed the
back of her legs and buttocks. 33 Several days later, the player
traveled with the team and the coach to a tournament.34
The coach argued that his actions did not fall within the pur-
view of the applicable statute because the evidence did not show a
custodial or supervisory relationship "at the time of the offensive
429. See id. at 677-78, 667 S.E.2d at 29. Bowden also noted that the intent element of
each offense was different. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 28-29. Aggravated sexual battery is a specif-
ic intent offense, while sodomy is a general intent offense. See id. at 678, 667 S.E.2d at 29.
430. 276 Va. 762, 763, 667 S.E.2d 783, 784 (2008). Virginia Code section 18.2-370.1
states in relevant part:
A. Any person 18 years of age or older who, except as provided in § 18.2-370,
maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship over a child under the age
of 18 and is not legally married to such child and such child is not emanci-
pated who, with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally (i) proposes
that any such child feel or fondle the sexual or genital parts of such person or
that such person feel or handle the sexual or genital parts of the child; or (ii)
proposes to such child the performance of an act of sexual intercourse or any
act constituting an offense under § 18.2-361; or (iii) exposes his or her sexual
or genital parts to such child; or (iv) proposes that any such child expose his
or her sexual or genital parts to such person; or (v) proposes to the child that
the child engage in sexual intercourse, sodomy or fondling of sexual or genital
parts with another person; or (vi) sexually abuses the child as defined in §
18.2-67.10 (6), shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
431. Sadler, 276 Va. at 764, 667 S.E.2d at 784.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
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conduct."435 The Sadler court dismissed the coach's interpretation
of the statute, noting that
Sadler's interpretation of Code § 18.2-370.1 imposes a limitation on
the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. In enacting this
provision, the General Assembly provided that the only prerequisite
for its application is that the offender "maintains a custodial or su-
pervisory relationship" at the time of the offense. Sadler's construc-
tion of the section limits this prerequisite to instances in which the
parties are engaged in activities related to that relationship at the
time the offensive conduct occurs. The language of the statute does
not support such a limitation and it is well established that in con-
struing penal statutes the Court "'must not add to the words of the
statute, nor ignore its actual words, and must strictly construe the
statute and limit its application to cases falling clearly within its
scope.'
4 36
In so reasoning, the Sadler court created a bright-line rule: it is
necessary that a custodial or supervisory relationship exists un-
der the statute, but it is not necessary that the prohibited conduct
be committed in the specific context of the relationship. 417 This
holding is consistent with the statute's purpose "to protect minors
from adults who might exploit certain types of relationships.."43
N. Larceny
In McEachern v. Commonwealth, the defendant claimed that
the evidence was insufficient to establish larceny because it did
not prove a permanent intent to deprive the victim of the ve-
hicle. 39 Instead, he argued, the taking was only temporary.440 The
defendant had engaged in a protracted and very violent alterca-
tion with his girlfriend in which he threatened to drive her to a
bridge, kill her there, and then commit suicide.441 Fortunately, the
victim managed to escape and call the police."2 The victim ob-
served the defendant driving away in her car and both she and
435. Id. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 784.
436. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 784-85 (quoting Phelps v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 139, 142,
654 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2008)).
437. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.1 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
438. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 785.
439. 52 Va. App. 679, 682-83, 667 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ct. App. 2008).
440. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 344-45.
441. See id. at 681-82, 667 S.E.2d at 344.
442. Id. at 682, 667 S.E.2d at 344.
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the police called the defendant on his cell phone. 44, The defendant
then spoke on the telephone with the victim." Perhaps lacking a
grasp of the obvious, the defendant demanded to know why she
had given the police his cell phone number.4 45 In turn, the victim
demanded that the defendant return her car."6 The defendant re-
sponded that he had abandoned the vehicle with the keys at a gas
station.447 The victim found it there the next day.448
The Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed that to be convicted of
larceny, the accused must intend to permanently deprive the
owner of property.449 The court noted that a trespassory taking
permits an inference, unless circumstances negate the inference,
that the taker intended to steal the property. 4 ° The defendant's
stated plan was to take the victim and kill her.41 Had he suc-
ceeded with this plan, the defendant would have permanently de-
prived the victim of her property. 42 Although the defendant ulti-
mately abandoned the vehicle, the court of appeals noted that the
fact finder could conclude that "he was retreating from a foiled at-
tempt at stealing the vehicle and murdering the victim after it
became apparent to him the police were involved."453 Abandoning
the plan later on did not alter the fact that the larceny was com-
plete at the time the defendant took the car.4 54
In Britt v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cluded that the evidence must show that the defendant exercised
dominion and control over goods abandoned or left behind for
these goods to "count" towards the $200 threshold required for a
felony larceny conviction. 4 5 In this case, a group of thieves broke
into a convenience store in the early hours of the morning. 56 The
443. Id.
444. See id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. See id. at 684-855, 667 S.E.2d at 345-46.
450. Id. at 685, 667 S.E.2d at 346.
451. Id. at 687, 667 S.E.2d at 347.
452. Id. at 687-88, 667 S.E.2d at 347.
453. Id. at 688, 667 S.E.2d at 347.
454. See id. (citing Slater v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 264, 267, 18 S.E.2d 909, 911
(1942)).
455. See 276 Va. 569, 574-75, 667 S.E.2d 763, 766 (2008).
456. See id. at 571, 667 S.E.2d at 764.
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defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, following a
chase.457 When the police were chasing him, he discarded packs of
cigarettes.158 There were also packs of cigarettes strewn on the
floor of the convenience store. 459 The evidence did not establish
their precise location on the floor.460
The defendant argued that the cigarettes could have been
knocked down rather than taken.461 Because larceny requires
complete dominion and control over the stolen items, he con-
tended, these items could not count towards establishing the val-
ue of the stolen goods.46 2 The court agreed.463 The court reasoned
that the evidence did not establish that the defendant actually
exercised dominion and control over the merchandise found on
the floor of the store, nor did the evidence prove asportation of
this merchandise.44 Because the estimated value of the stolen
merchandise included the items recovered on the floor of the
store, the court remanded the case for a reevaluation of the
amount of the goods actually stolen.46 5
The sufficiency of the evidence to prove the defendant's larcen-
ous intent was at issue in Vincent v. Commonwealth.466 Police ar-
rived at a store shortly after the manager found shattered glass.467
A videotape of the defendant's movements in the store was intro-
duced into evidence.46 8 When the defendant was apprehended in a
state of intoxication several hours later, no merchandise was
found on the defendant, and the store manager could not tell
whether any merchandise had been stolen. 469 The defendant was
convicted of breaking and entering with the intent to commit lar-
ceny. 470 The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that in drawing
an inference of larcenous intent, "a trier of fact may not reasona-
457. See id. at 572, 667 S.E.2d at 764.
458. Id.
459. See id.
460. See id.
461. See id. at 573, 667 S.E.2d at 765.
462. Id. at 572-73, 667 S.E.2d at 765.
463. See id. at 575, 667 S.E.2d at 766.
464. Id.
465. See id. at 575-76, 667 S.E.2d at 766.
466. See 276 Va. 648, 650, 668 S.E.2d 137, 138 (2008).
467. See id.
468. Id. at 650 n.1, 668 S.E.2d at 138 n.1.
469. See id. at 650-51, 668 S.E.2d at 138-39.
470. Id. at 650, 668 S.E.2d at 138.
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bly infer the specific intent to commit larceny merely from the ab-
sence of evidence showing a different intent. " 47 1 The court held
that the evidence failed to show such an intent and reversed his
conviction. 472 In short, vandalism is not tantamount to larceny.
In Williams v. Commonwealth, a man broke into two trailers
and stole copper and brass.47 The items were too heavy to lift
alone, so the thief called the defendant. 474 The defendant agreed to
help; once there, he assisted by lifting the containers of copper
and brass onto a truck.47 Later, after the defendant was arrested
on unrelated charges, he admitted that he and the other person
did not have permission to take the containers. 476 The defendant
was convicted of grand larceny and conspiracy to commit grand
larceny. 477
On appeal, the defendant did not challenge that he and the
other man had "agreed... to steal the containers of metal ....
Instead, he seized on the word "preconcert" in the Common-
wealth's jurisprudence and argued that he could not be guilty of
conspiracy because his fellow thief "had already committed larce-
ny before the two men entered into an agreement."147 The court of
appeals, however, rejected the defendant's attempt to place him-
self outside of the offense of conspiracy by noting that larceny,
unlike many other offenses, is a continuing offense.41°
"[W]here property has been feloniously taken, every act of removal or
change of possession by the thief constitute[s] a new taking and as-
portation; and, as the right of possession, as well as the right of
property, continues in the owner, every such act is a new violation of
the owner's right of property and possession."4"'
471. Id. at 654, 668 S.E.2d at 141.
472. See id. at 655, 668 S.E.2d at 141.
473. 53 Va. App. 50, 54, 669 S.E.2d 354, 355 (Ct. App. 2008).
474. See id.
475. Id.
476. See id.
477. See id. at 54-55, 669 S.E.2d at 356.
478. Id. at 60, 669 S.E.2d at 358.
479. Id.
480. See id. at 60, 669 S.E.2d at 359 (citing Commonwealth v. Cousins, 29 Va. (2 Leigh)
708 (1830)).
481. Id. (quoting Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 527, 35 S.E.2d 763, 766
(1945)).
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Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defen-
dant's conspiracy to commit larceny conviction.4 2 The "new act" of
asportation by the defendant and the original thief, after the con-
tainers had been removed from the trailers, constituted a new
taking and asportation that was the result of an express prior
agreement.43
0. Pandering
Virginia Code section 18.2-357 provides in relevant part that
"[any person who shall knowingly receive any money or other
valuable thing from the earnings of any male or female engaged
in prostitution, except for a consideration deemed good and valu-
able in law, shall be guilty of pandering .... "48 In other words,
the defendant should not be convicted of pandering if the money
he received from a prostitute was for some legitimate reason.
In a case aptly styled Tart v. Commonwealth, the defendant
was charged with pandering.45 He requested a jury instruction
placing the burden on the prosecution to prove that he did not re-
ceive "'consideration [ I deemed good and valuable in law' .... -6
The Commonwealth responded that this was an affirmative de-
fense, with the burden resting on the defendant. 487 To resolve the
question, the Court of Appeals of Virginia relied on a passage
from a 1947 decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia. In the con-
text of analyzing whether an indictment impermissibly created a
variance, that court had stated:
"The [pandering] statute pronounces the crime when a person kno-
wingly receives money from the earnings of a prostitute except for a
good or valuable consideration. The character of the consideration
becomes important only when evidence is offered that there was con-
sideration. If such evidence is offered, the Commonwealth would
have to show that the consideration was not good or valuable .... 4
482. Id. at 61, 669 S.E.2d at 359.
483. See id. at 60-61, 669 S.E.2d at 359.
484. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-357 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (emphasis added).
485. 52 Va. App. 272, 274, 663 S.E.2d 113, 114 (Ct. App. 2008).
486. See id. at 276, 663 S.E.2d at 115.
487. See id.
488. Id. at 279, 663 S.E.2d at 116-17 (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 186 Va.
1000, 1005-06, 45 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1947)).
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Based on this description of the offense, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia concluded that the defendant was required to raise as an
affirmative defense that "there was some consideration given in
exchange for the earnings of the prostitute." 89 The court further
ruled that the defendant had failed to produce any evidence that
would have entitled him to a jury instruction on this issue.490 The
defendant had received money from the prostitute, but he had
spent the funds plying her with alcohol and illegal drugs and pay-
ing for hotel rooms so that she could engage in prostitution.4 9 1
None of this, the court concluded, constituted "consideration as a
matter of law."492
P. Photographing Intimate Parts
In Wilson v. Commonwealth, a young woman wearing a dress
was examining clothes on a clothing rack when she noticed the
defendant.4 93 He was crouched or lying on the ground underneath
a rack of clothes, and he photographed her legs and undergar-
ments. 494 The defendant contended that, because the incident un-
folded in a public place, the victim had no "'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.' and, therefore, he could not be convicted for his
actions under Virginia Code section 18.2-386.1. 4 95 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia rejected this argument.4 96 The court observed
that the statute contained two applicable clauses.4 97 The first
clause prohibits photographing or videotaping the victim in non-
public locations such as restrooms and tanning booths.4 9 The
second clause addresses photographing or videotaping "'beneath
or between [the victim's] legs,"' regardless of whether the victim
is in a public or a private place, provided that the victim's "'inti-
mate parts or undergarments covering those intimate parts"'
489. Id. at 279-80, 663 S.E.2d at 117.
490. See id. at 280, 663 S.E.2d at 117.
491. Id. at 280-81, 663 S.E.2d at 117.
492. Id. at 281, 663 S.E.2d at 117.
493. 53 Va. App. 599, 606, 673 S.E.2d 923, 926 (Ct. App. 2009).
494. See id.
495. See id. at 602, 673 S.E.2d at 924 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2008)).
496. Id. at 604, 673 S.E.2d at 925.
497. Id.
498. See id,, 673 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1(A)(i) (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
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were not "'visible to the general public.' 499 The requirement that
the victim otherwise have a "'reasonable expectation of privacy"'
applies to both provisions of the statute, the court concluded.5 0°
The court observed that "[the victim... was wearing clothing
covering her undergarments while shopping in a public location"
and, therefore, had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" as to
those undergarments for purposes of the statute.50 1
Q. Protective Orders
Although fact-bound to a certain degree, Elliott v. Common-
wealth provides examples of what types of conduct are sufficient
to sustain a finding that a defendant violated a protective order.2
In this case, a juvenile and domestic relations district court is-
sued a protective order directing the defendant to cease contact
with his wife and their minor child. 0 3 On July 6, 2007, after the
protective order had been issued, the defendant called his wife,
asking to talk to their child. 0 4 On July 17, 2007, the defendant
parked a block from his wife's residence, but he did not telephone
or approach her.505 The defendant was convicted of violating the
protective order for each incident.506 On appeal, the defendant
contended that the evidence was insufficient, claiming that he
had not phoned his wife and thus had made no direct contact with
her on July 17, and that "the visual contact was not a violation of
the protective order."507
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction for the
telephone call because a telephone call constitutes contact in vi-
olation of the order.5 8 As to the second incident, however, the
court reversed the conviction because, although the defendant
made himself openly visible to his wife, he was parked a block
499. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1(A)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2009) (emphasis re-
moved).
500. Id. at 605, 673 S.E.2d at 926.
501. See id.
502. See 277 Va. 457, 675 S.E.2d 178 (2009).
503. See id. at 460, 675 S.E.2d at 180.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 460-61, 675 S.E.2d at 180.
506. Id. at 460, 675 S.E.2d at 180.
507. Id. at 461, 675 S.E.2d at 180.
508. See id. at 463, 675 S.E.2d at 181-82.
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away and posed no threat of harm.5 9 Due to the absence of poten-
tial harm or an intent to communicate with his wife, the court
reasoned that there could be no violation of the protective order.5 10
Such orders are issued to safeguard the health and physical safe-
ty of the wife.-"
The court offered guidance as to what would be considered a
contact that may violate a protective order in the future.512 Al-
though the order prohibited "any" contact, the court interpreted
the order to only include "intentional acts."513 The court refused to
further specify the limits of the term "contacts," stating that "the
statute permits a protective order that prohibits the respondent
from entering a reasonable distance-defined space around the pe-
titioner and, thus, intentionally making visual contact with the
petitioner."514 Virginia courts will no doubt revisit the issue of how
close is too close to protect the health and safety of a victim.
In Nolen v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with
the felony of violating a protective order.51' This charge requires
proof that the defendant inflicts a "serious bodily injury."51 6 In
that case, a juvenile and domestic relations district court issued a
protective order against the defendant, the victim's former boy-
friend.51 7 About two weeks after the order was issued, the defen-
dant surprised the victim as she tried to enter her home.118 He
grabbed her keys as she tried to open her door, hit her, and
dragged her toward the backyard. 19 "As she sat on the ground,
leaning against the house, he kicked her repeatedly in her head,
chest, shoulders, face, and back. She estimated he hit or kicked
her fifteen to twenty times."520
In denying the defendant's motion to strike, the trial court
noted that the victim had a cut and bleeding lip, adding that
509. See id. at 464, 675 S.E.2d at 182-83.
510. Id.
511. See id. at 463, 675 S.E.2d at 182.
512. See id. at 463-64, 675 S.E.2d at 182.
513. See id. at 464, 675 S.E.2d at 182.
514. Id.
515. 53 Va. App. 593, 599, 673 S.E.2d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2009).
516. Id. at 597 n.2, 693 S.E.2d at 922 n.2.
517. Id. at 595, 673 S.E.2d at 921.
518. See id. at 595-96, 673 S.E.2d at 921.
519. Id. at 596, 673 S.E.2d at 921.
520. Id.
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"'[W]hen a woman is stomped so hard that three days after the in-
jury she has a tread mark of a shoe or work boot on her head,
that's a serious injury.' 52'
The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the defendant's at-
tempts to import definitions of "serious bodily injury" from other
statutes.522 The court noted that, in each of the statutes the de-
fendant cited, the legislature had used language limiting the de-
finition to that particular statute.52 Turning then to the plain
language of the statute at issue, Virginia Code section 16.1-253.2,
the court found that the evidence established that the victim "was
bruised and lacerated, bore marks on her body, and bled. She
missed several days of work and suffered pain, requiring medica-
tion for an extended period of time. "'Bodily injury comprehends,
it would seem, any bodily hurt whatsoever."' Unquestionably, the
victim suffered bodily injury."524 Nevertheless, the court reviewed
the dictionary definitions and found
[a] "serious bodily injury" as proscribed by Code § 16.1-253.2 is one
that can fairly and reasonably be deemed not trifling, grave, giving
rise to apprehension, giving rise to considerable care, and attended
with danger. The injuries inflicted upon the victim satisfy this defi-
nition and support the trial court's holding that they constituted "se-
rious" bodily injuries.121
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Nolen set a
floor for the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction. Future
cases will delineate that threshold with greater precision.
R. Robbery
In McMorris v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
made clear that participating in the battery of the victim does not
necessarily translate into criminal liability when the victim is al-
so robbed. 26 The defendant, along with others, attacked the vic-
521. Id.
522. See id. at 597, 673 S.E.2d at 922.
523. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(E) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2009) (ter-
mination of parental rights for serious bodily injury)); id. § 18.2-371.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009)
(infliction of serious injury on minor child in custodial relationship)).
524. Id. at 597-98, 673 S.E.2d at 922 (quoting Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310,
316, 53 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1949)).
525. Id. at 599, 673 S.E.2d at 923.
526. See 276 Va. 500, 507-08, 666 S.E.2d 348, 352 (2008).
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tim.527 During the course of the beating, the victim's wallet and
cell phone fell to the ground.58 One of the assailants, but not the
defendant, grabbed the wallet and the telephone 29 The defendant
did not leave with the person who took the wallet and phone. 530
McMorris was convicted of robbery as a principal in the second
degree.5 31 He appealed, contending that the evidence was insuffi-
cient.5 32
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed.533 The court noted that
to be convicted as a principal in the second degree, the defendant
must share the criminal intent of the person carrying out the
crime and mere presence does not suffice for conviction.534 A lack
of intent to commit the crime is a defense, except where there is
concert of action.535 Where concert of action is present, a defen-
dant may be held liable if the crime is a "natural and probable
consequence of the intended wrongful act."5 6 Applying these prin-
ciples to the facts before it, the court concluded that there was no
direct evidence linking McMorris to the robbery.5 37 The circums-
tantial evidence did "not exclude the reasonable conclusion that
McMorris did not observe [the victim's] property fall to the
ground and that he did not have knowledge of the principal's in-
tent to commit the robbery."538 Finally, the theory of concert of ac-
tion did not establish McMorris's criminal liability because a rob-
bery is not a "natural and probable consequence" of a battery. 539
S. Weapons Offenses
Established precedents continue to tumble following the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's decision in Farrakhan v. Common-
527. See id. at 504, 666 S.E.2d at 350.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 505, 666 S.E.2d at 350.
532. See id. at 503, 666 S.E.2d at 349.
533. See id. at 508, 666 S.E.2d at 352.
534. Id. at 505, 666 S.E.2d at 350-51.
535. See id. at 506, 666 S.E.2d at 351 (citing Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523,
528, 79 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1954)).
536. Id.
537. See id.
538. Id. at 507, 666 S.E.2d at 351.
539. Id. at 507-08, 666 S.E.2d at 352.
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wealth.50 In that case, the court held that not every item would
qualify as a "weapon of like kind" under Virginia Code section
18.2-308(A)." Rather, the item in question must be a "weapon.
If it qualifies as a weapon, it must also constitute a weapon that
shares characteristics with the enumerated items in the statute
"such that its concealment is prohibited.."54 3 In Delcid v. Com-
monwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that a
"butterfly knife" was a "weapon of like kind" for purposes of the
statute prohibiting felons from possessing a concealed weapon.54 4
Eight years later, in Thompson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme
Court of Virginia overruled Delcid. The court relied on the tes-
timony of a police officer at trial to conclude that the butterfly
knife was indeed a weapon.m6 However, the court found that the
knife was not a weapon of like kind to those enumerated in the
statute.547 The court reasoned that the butterfly knife did not re-
semble a dirk, because the butterfly knife contains a single sharp
edge instead of two, has no protective guard, and is not set in a
hilt.54 In the court's view, the butterfly knife in question was
more like a pocket knife than a sword or dirk.5 4 The court did not
compare the butterfly knife to a switchblade, one of the weapons
enumerated in the statute, but noted in passing that the butterfly
knife does not resemble the other enumerated weapons. 5 1 Virgin-
ia courts used to be quite generous in concluding that a weapon
was one of "like kind," but it is now abundantly clear that the Su-
preme Court of Virginia will construe very strictly any attempt to
categorize a weapon as one "of like kind."
The defendant in King v. Commonwealth conceded that he had
discharged a firearm within 1000 feet of the property line of a
private therapeutic day school that operated under a lease with a
Catholic church.551 The defendant asserted that the evidence was
540. 273 Va. 177, 639 S.E.2d 227 (2007).
541. See id. at 182-83, 639 S.E.2d at 230.
542. Id. at 182, 639 S.E.2d at 230.
543. Id.
544. See 32 Va. App. 14, 18, 526 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ct. App. 2000).
545. 277 Va. 280, 291, 673 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2009).
546. See id. at 288-89, 673 S.E.2d at 472-73.
547. See id. at 289, 673 S.E.2d at 473.
548. See id. at 290-91, 673 S.E.2d at 473-74.
549. See id.
550. See id. at 291, 673 S.E.2d at 474.
551. 53 Va. App. 257, 260-61, 670 S.E.2d 767, 769 (Ct. App. 2009).
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nevertheless insufficient to establish his guilt of discharging a
firearm within 1000 feet of a school because he discharged the
firearm after 8:00 p.m. and the school's lease allowed them access
to the premises from only 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 552
The court of appeals found the plain meaning of the statute
dispositive.553 The court noted that Virginia Code section 18.2-
280(C) drew no distinction between schools that lease facilities
and those that do not, nor did it limit its application to schools
that were in session. 5 4 In short, the property was either a school
or not a school, and the court would not consider who may be us-
ing the property at any given time in making such a determina-
tion.55 Moreover, the court observed that the legislature had
enacted certain exceptions to the prohibitions set forth therein,
and the defendant's scenario did not fit within any of the excep-
tions.55 6 Finally, the court reasoned that the legislature is undoub-
tedly aware that many schools are used for a variety of activities
by any number of groups in our communities.5 57 Adopting the de-
fendant's interpretation of the statute, therefore, would not only
conflict with the rules of statutory construction, but also would
significantly encumber enforcement of the statute.55
In a case that will likely inure to the benefit of prosecutors, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia applied the doctrine of constructive
possession to Virginia Code section 18.2-308.4(C). 5 9 In Wright v.
Commonwealth, police seized a small amount of cocaine from the
defendant. 560 The defendant admitted he had more cocaine at his
residence and gave the officer the keys to his apartment.561 The
detective recovered a loaded gun, 114 grams of crack cocaine,
552. Id.
553. See id. at 262-63, 670 S.E.2d at 770. Virginia Code section 18.2-280(C) provides:
If any person willfully discharges or causes to be discharged any firearm
upon any public property within 1,000 feet of the property line of any public,
private or religious elementary, middle or high school property he shall be
guilty of a Class 4 felony, unless he is engaged in lawful hunting.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-280(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
554. See King, 53 Va. App. at 264-65, 670 S.E.2d at 771.
555. See id. at 265, 670 S.E.2d at 771.
556. Id. at 263-64, 670 S.E.2d at 770.
557. See id. at 265, 670 S.E.2d at 771.
558. See id. at 264, 670 S.E.2d at 771.
559. Wright v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 266, 287, 670 S.E.2d 772, 782 (Ct. App.
2009).
560. Id. at 270, 670 S.E.2d at 774.
561. Id.
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scales, and packaging paraphernalia from the apartment. 562 On
appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
for his conviction for possessing a firearm while possessing co-
caine with the intent to distribute.563 The defendant argued that
the Commonwealth had to prove he was in actual, simultaneous
possession of the drugs and firearm to sustain a conviction.'6
The Wright court upheld the defendant's conviction. 6 5 The
court based its decision on the plain language of the statute and
the differences between subsection C, under which the defendant
was convicted, and the other subsections.5 6  Subsection C, unlike
the other subsections of the statute, does not require actual pos-
session on one's person.567 This phrasing is consistent with the
application of the principles of constructive possession. Addition-
ally, the court found that the evidence established a nexus be-
tween the firearm and the drugs, which the defendant admitted
owning.568 A constructively possessed firearm can "'further, ad-
vance, or help' a dealer because "an accessible gun provides de-
fense against anyone who may attempt to rob the trafficker of his
drugs or drug profits... [and] possessing a gun, and letting eve-
ryone know that you are armed, lessens the chances that a rob-
bery will even be attempted."56 9
The defendant in Rose v. Commonwealth asserted that he could
not be convicted of "using" a firearm in the commission of a rob-
bery when the use consisted of beating the victim with the gun to
force the victim to relinquish a bag of cash.570 The defendant ar-
gued that Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1 does not prohibit club-
bing the victim with a gun.571
562. Id.
563. See id. at 269, 670 S.E.2d at 773.
564. See id. at 271, 670 S.E.2d at 774.
565. Id. at 269, 670 S.E.2d at 773.
566. See id. at 277-78, 670 S.E.2d at 777-78.
567. Id. at 280, 670 S.E.2d at 779.
568. Id. at 286-87, 670 S.E.2d at 782.
569. Id. at 283, 670 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting United Sates v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d
409, 412 (5th Cir. 2000)). The court of appeals affirmed a nearly identical case, Hargrove v.
Commonwealth, in 2009. 53 Va. App. 545, 561, 673 S.E.2d 896, 904 (Ct. App. 2009). In
Hargrove, the defendant admitted "the pistol located on the kitchen table, adjacent to the
pantry where he placed the marijuana package, belonged to him and that he used it for his
protection." Id. at 560, 673 S.E.2d at 904.
570. See 53 Va. App. 505, 508-09, 673 S.E.2d 489, 490 (Ct. App. 2009).
571. Id. at 508, 673 S.E.2d at 490.
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia first noted that the defendant
did not contest the fact that the weapon he used was, in fact, a
firearm. 72 Next, the court reasoned that the term "use" should be
construed according to its plain meaning.-73 The court also noted
that the purposes of the statute are to "deter violent criminal
conduct," and to "prevent[ I actual physical injury and also to dis-
courage criminal conduct that produces fear of physical harm."574
The court held that both the plain language of the statute and its
purpose supported a conviction for using a firearm when that
firearm is used as a club.',, The court bolstered this conclusion by
noting that other state courts construing similar statutes had un-
animously reached the same conclusion . 5 7
The defendant also argued that in order to be convicted of use
of a firearm in the commission of a felony, the victim must perce-
ive the gun as a firearm. 577 The court again disagreed, observing
that the statute was written in the disjunctive, prohibiting either
the "use" or the "display" of the firearm.171 In light of this distinc-
tion, the court held,
it is clear that the victim's perception is relevant only in instances
when the object is being displayed, not used. In such a case, the in-
jury is intimidation or fear of physical harm. However, if the victim
sustains actual physical injury from the use of an actual firearm, the
victim's belief of whether or not the gun is a dangerous weapon is ir-
relevant. In those instances, the offense is completed when the in-
jury is inflicted.5 71
T. Use of a Communications System to Solicit from a Minor
In Podracky v. Commonwealth, Podracky was arrested at a ho-
tel after he used his computer to make arrangements to meet two
teenage girls for a tryst.58 ° He was convicted of using a communi-
572. Id. at 513, 673 S.E.2d at 492.
573. Id. at 512, 673 S.E.2d at 492.
574. Id. (citing Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 358
(1980)).
575. See id. at 512-13, 673 S.E.2d at 492.
576. See id. at 510-12, 673 S.E.2d at 491-92.
577. Id. at 513, 673 S.E.2d at 492.
578. Id. at 513-14, 673 S.E.2d at 493.
579. Id. at 516, 673 S.E.2d at 494.
580. 52 Va. App. 130, 133, 662 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 2008).
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cations system to solicit sexual favors from a minor.5 1 He chal-
lenged his conviction on the ground that the statute is facially
overbroad under the First Amendment.82
In rejecting the claim, the court of appeals first noted that of-
fers to engage in illegal activity do not benefit from First
Amendment protection.5 8 3 The court found inapt the analogy be-
tween the Virginia statute at issue and the Communications De-
cency Act.58 4 Unlike the Communications Decency Act, which was
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in Reno v.
ACLU, the Virginia statute does not prohibit communicating in-
decent materials to minors; rather, it prohibits the knowing use
of a communications system to solicit a minor for criminal acts.585
The court observed that other courts had upheld similar statutes
against a First Amendment challenge.586 Finally, the fact that the
defendant could be mistaken about the age of the person soli-
cited-thinking he was soliciting a minor, but in actuality solicit-
ing an adult-did not give rise to any constitutional problem587
The court observed that "'[o]ffers to deal in illegal products or
otherwise engage in illegal activity do not acquire First Amend-
ment protection when the offeror is mistaken about the factual
predicate of his offer.' '5 88
IX. LEGISLATION
Given the Commonwealth's severe budgetary constraints, legis-
lative changes this year were modest.
A. Arrest Warrants
Magistrates are now prohibited from issuing felony arrest war-
rants based on a citizen complaint without prior consultation
581. Id. at 132, 662 S.E.2d at 82.
582. See id.
583. Id. at 135-36, 662 S.E.2d at 84.
584. See id. at 136-38, 662 S.E.2d at 84-86.
585. Id at 137-38, 662 S.E.2d at 85; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
586. See id. at 136, 662 S.E.2d at 84.
587. See id. at 141, 662 S.E.2d at 87.
588. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S ..... 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1843
(2008)).
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with the Commonwealth's Attorney, or, if none is available, with
a law enforcement officer.189
B. Audio and Video Appearance
District courts are now required to use two-way electronic video
and audio communication, if available, for pre-trial appearances
to determine bail or representation by counsel."'
C. Illegal Drugs
Existing Virginia law provided for a sentencing enhancement
for persons who were convicted more than once of possession of
drugs with the intent to distribute.5 91 Now, persons previously
convicted in another state of a similar offense will see their sub-
sequent sentences in Virginia enhanced as well. 592
D. Investigating Crime
With counterfeit purses and the like readily available, the
General Assembly expanded the jurisdiction of multi-
jurisdictional grand juries to include trademark infringement
cases. 93 The General Assembly also authorized circuit courts to
issue a search warrant for corporations located out of state that
provide electronic communication services or remote computing
services in Virginia. 594
589. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-45 (Supp. 2009). However, given the holding in Virginia
v. Moore, a failure to follow this rule would not have any significance for purposes of sup-
pressing evidence under the Fourth Amendment. 553 U.S ___. 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1608
(2008).
590. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-3.1(A) (Supp. 2009).
591. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
592. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
593. See Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 491, 2009 Va. Acts. 215, 215 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-215.1 (Supp. 2009)).
594. See Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 378, 2009 Va. Acts 747, 747 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3(C) (Supp. 2009)). Whether out of state corporations and juris-
dictions will comply with such warrants remains to be seen.
[Vol. 44:339
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
E. One Year and a Day Rule Abolished
At common law, a prosecution for murder or manslaughter
could not be initiated if more than one year and a day had passed
between the defendant's act and the victim's death.5 95 This rule is
now abolished, and a prosecution for murder can proceed regard-
less of the time lapse between the defendant's actions and the vic-
tim's death. 96
F. Possession of Ammunition by Convicted Felons
Convicted felons previously could not possess a firearm.597 Now
they are also expressly forbidden from possessing ammunition for
a firearm. 98
G. Texting While Driving
To the extent there was any doubt that the reckless driving
statute prohibited the practice, composing and reading text mes-
sages while driving is now expressly forbidden.5 99 Law enforce-
ment and emergency personnel are exempted.6 °°
595. See Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 84, 95, 654 S.E.2d 345, 351 (Ct.
App. 2007).
596. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8.1 (Supp. 2009).
597. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
598. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
599. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
600. Id. § 46.2-107.8.1(B).
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